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In international studies we find realists, liberal internationalists, constructivists, international legalists, and moralists mostly of the cosmopolitan variety, but even these are divided between consequentialists and ontological theorists who focus on internal intentions rather than on the external results of an action as a basis for assessment. Michael Ignatieff is one of the few thinkers who has tried to escape the confines of each of these categories, not by ignoring them, but by trying to weave them together into some systematic relationship even if he has not done so systematically. I, too, have been trying to do the same and have expounded a position I have called moral realism or pragmatic idealism.​[1]​ 

Further, a major concern of mine has been to understand why bystanders act and risk their lives to save others who are strangers​[2]​ while other historical agents engage in the slaughter of people who are not strangers but proximate others​[3]​. They are people who have been very close and lived side by side but are now regarded as different, as other, as lesser, as worthy of removal and even extermination. Michael Ignatieff too has been concerned with why humans feel and act upon a sense of moral obligation to strangers. He has written a quartet of books dealing in turn with the dynamics of ethnic conflict as nation-states disintegrate into ethnic civil war as warlords become the arbiters of history in the name of ethnic nationalism (Blood and Belonging, 1993), the impulse to take responsibility and act on behalf of these strangers when we observe the atrocities on television (The Warrior’s Honor, 1997), the dilemmas of intervention when we do respond (Virtual War, 2000), and on the imperial effort to impose order after an intervention (Empire Lite, 2003). Focussed on what one of his colleagues termed his obsession with “truth in turbulent times,” Michael as an intellectual, commentator and reporter has accomplished this task with brilliance, tremendous insight and always in elegant prose.

I have approached these issues from a somewhat different direction, starting with the refugees that primarily result from those civil wars​[4]​, the portrait of individual bystanders such as Oscar Schindler that tell one story of why they came to take the risk for others who were strangers while the actual historical facts seem to tell a somewhat different story. This alternative trajectory then converged with Michael’s focus on the rationale for intervention and then crossed over into the aftermath of reconciliation in intrastate wars while Michael focused on the interstate relations between the intervener and nation-building in the state in which the intervention took place. So our issues have been very complementary even as we approached them for somewhat different angles.

Both of us began as undergraduates at the University of Toronto, I almost a decade earlier than Michael. Although I began with the study of medicine, it appears that Michael only flirted with this possibility. Michael was trained in history (PhD Harvard) and early on specialized, just as one of his intellectual heroes, Isaiah Berlin did, in the history of ideas and institutions. I have been trained in philosophy but have had a major interest as well in the history of ideas. Though I have spent several sabbaticals away at other universities, my base over more than three decades has remained in Toronto at York University. Michael has been far more peripatetic, teaching or enjoying fellowships at UBC, Cambridge, the Ėcole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales in Paris, Harvard, Oxford, University of California, University of London, London School of Economics, Cornell and Duke, and is at the time of this writing, Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights and Policy at the Kennedy School for Government at Harvard University, and Professor of the Practice of Human Rights Policy. During his career, he has written memoirs​[5]​ and novels, one of which – Scar Tissue – was nominated for a Giller Prize. He has been a prominent journalist, public intellectual and broadcaster. Though I have had none of the range of Michael, I have produced and hosted a one-hour television show called Israel Today for the last five years. Ignatieff has also served on several commissions of inquiry, particularly on Kosovo and most recently on the International Commission on Sovereignty and Intervention. My base has always remained in academia although I have participated in many government and research studies of refugees, the role of bystanders in genocide, the ethical foundations of intervention and the processes of early warning, peacekeeping, peacemaking and reconciliation. Both of us have traveled to many of the countries where these horrific events took place, overlapping a bit in a discussion of the Kurds and Bosnia, and to a small degree on our common native country, Canada, as well as Germany. Though I have worked in Sri Lanka and Lebanon, I have had a primary focus on the Israeli/Palestinian conflict and the conflicts in Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, and, to some degree, Sudan. In addition to the crises on which we overlapped, Michael’s key cases have been Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, though he has also discussed Northern Ireland. We have both been concerned with understanding nationalism and with the civil state. While Michael filled his accounts with keen observations and insights and filled his books with richly described depictions of individual people and stories of their lives, I have been more removed and focused on decision-making in states and international organizations. Michael is a master story teller and a brilliant wordsmith, and I have used and quoted some of his phrases such as the importance of truth commissions in ruling out “impermissible lies” in my recent article on reconciliation.​[6]​

However, though we have covered complementary issues and seemed to be developing a comprehensive philosophical theory, in my case, much more explicitly, all along the way different elements in Michael’s accounts jarred me even as I concurred in most of what he had said and admired the brilliance with which he articulated his views.  However, it has also become increasingly clearer that our philosophical premises and ethical outlooks are quite at odds even though we both could be labeled moral realists or pragmatic idealists. 

The purpose of this account is threefold: first, to provide a comprehensive, coherent and systematic account of Michael’s position on intervention and to critique it thereby using his thesis as a foil to clarify my own. I have always believed that the best studies are comparative. Further, it is far better to distinguish oneself from another with whom you share a lot and whom you genuinely admire and respect than with someone with whom you share little and do not have the same respect. In one sense, this is the reversal of the approach to treating the proximate other as a pariah to be cleansed or exterminated. For the effort is to set a dialogue in motion, both with my own developing theories and with Michael’s. Third, by undertaking this comparative analysis, I will now distinguish moral realism from pragmatic idealism which I had previously taken as equivalents. I will identify Michael Ignatieff’s position as moral realism while mine will be characterized as pragmatic idealism.

I begin with a discussion of Michael Ignatieff’s general method as my introduction to the whole analysis, particularly his historiographical methods using a sketchy depiction of my own at this stage to bring out more clearly Ignatieff’s approach and to adumbrate a few possible shortcomings as much as I identify with much of what he says and how he proceeds.

I then start Chapter 1 with a summary of Michael Ignatieff’s doctrine of intervention and then break that doctrine down into the goals, the means utilized, the process of connecting means and ends, and the rationale in terms of both causes and reasons for an intervention. Michael’s doctrine of intervention also includes an account of the required prequel and the requisite follow-up, which I have termed the Forward and Afterward. Further, as important as the doctrine, the conditions that provide the ethical boundaries or limits under which intervention is to be exercised are equally critical. There is also an account of the significance of such an intervention and the results of failure in an upsurge of the demon ethno-and religious nationalism in the Middle East. A central part of my focus is an analysis of Ignatieff’s concept of ethno-nationalism. The whole account is focused on the intervention in Iraq to illustrate the theory and its implications and the conclusions derived from it.

In Chapter 2, I begin with an analysis of Michael’s case study method in comparison to my own. I will then articulate my own theory and compare it to Michael Ignatieff’s. Then I will discuss other specific cases beginning with the Kurds, then Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, but add to them discussions of Sri Lanka, Lebanon, Israel Somalia, Rwanda, Zaire and the Sudan to assess to what degree the cases uphold the two different explications of intervention.

For me, Chapter 3 is perhaps the most interesting for it tries to get to the roots of the differences between Michael’s account of intervention and my own by exploring the philosophical foundations of the respective theories in the Biblical account of Cain and Abel, in the doctrine of Augustine, in the works of Hobbes, Locke and the Scottish Enlightenment – all of which are discussed by Michael. I approach the same topics from a Hegelian perspective rather than that of a Humean skeptic.​[7]​ 





Introduction – On Method

	Michel Ignatieff is not only a historian of ideas and contemporary affairs deeply rooted in the direct observations and witnessing of a journalist; he is a moralist, for the narratives he presents always have a moral purpose, to tell the powerful agents in history how they could and should behave otherwise, not simply in terms of realpolitik and economic interests but in terms of morality as well.​[8]​ “The function of historical understanding was to identify the precise range within which historical actors enjoyed room for maneuver, to understand how and why they used their freedom, and to evaluate their actions by the standard of what real alternatives were possible to them at that time.” (1998, p. 206) However, Michael is also an epistemological as well as a political realist (as we shall see). That means, he believes that there are basic facts that we can observe and describe, including facts of history. The primary responsibility of journalists and historians is to provide an account of that reality. In contrast, there are those who distort and deform that reality to create mythological instead of historical accounts. Those myths are not just different; they deny reality. “Myth is a version of the past that refuses to be just the past. Myth is a narrative shaped by desire, not by truth, formed not by the facts as best we can establish them but by our longing to be reassured and consoled. (1997, p. 167) More important, these myths are constructed in order to provide a narrative that denies the reality of the proximate other whom we have been led to fear as well as to assuage and comfort us, so that such myths serve the same purpose that Karl Marx ascribed to religion, to be an opiate that allows us to repress and forget what really happened in history. There is always a political agenda behind the construction. 

The purpose of journalism and history is to enlighten and free us up from the burdens of a mythological past that imprisons us within a narrative that denies the reality of the other and tries to provide the comfort of a communal womb. “Coming awake means to renounce such longings, to recover all the sharpness of the distinction between what is true and what we wish were true.” (1997, p. 167) That is why James Joyce through such characters as Stephen Daedelus in The Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man is a hero for Ignatieff. “Joyce’s writing is a long rebuke to versions of history as heritage, as roots and belonging, as comfort, refuge, and home. His was the opposite claim: You could be yourself only if you escaped home, if you struggled awake from the dreams of your ancestors.” (1997, p. 166)

Facts could be established and referenced as a foundation for dissipating myths. Further, for Michael, if the particularities of facts could be established on solid ground, so could certain values, such as the respect owed to the other or that murder, rape and lying are wrong, for these are universal values applicable across time and space. However, this is not true of thoughts and ideas about how those values relate to particular facts. A fact of history was true or it was not. Core values were constant. However, history is not just about facts that related t particular points in time but it is about thoughts and ideas that try to connect facts to values that stand outside of the exigencies of time. That demand of historiography raised for Ignatieff, as it did for Berlin, “the central problem of philosophy itself: whether the idea of continuous, stable human values could be reconciled with the manifest historical variation in the way these values were expressed across time, across cultures and between individuals within cultures.” (1998, p. 88)
Like Isaiah Berlin, Ignatieff took on the responsibility of being the spectator of the worst his age had to offer and to provide a record of those atrocities and the impact they had on his own reflections about what he saw and heard as “a highly intelligent spectator in God’s big but mostly not very attractive theater” (1998, p. 194) in order to understand the complexity of the relations to oneself and to the world around us. In delving into the complexities and competing narratives of each case in such specificity, Michael Ignatieff was a fox. But like Berlin, he was also a secret hedgehog who, through the accounts of ethnic conflict and what he viewed as the horrors of ethnic nationalism that provided the stimulus for strangers to express their concern and responsibility for the victims of these irrational forces and to intervene and impose order, developed (though never articulated as such) a grand overall theory of international affairs in general and of intervention of one state in the internal affairs of another in particular, a theory that at one and the same time supported the doctrine of unilateral intervention of the right in America while, at the same time, he criticized the execution of that intervention precisely because he shared the strong sense and highest regard for respecting others rights, a position which tends to be the hallmark these days of soft liberals, thus setting himself as an object of criticism from both sides. His major theme was the responsibility to intervene and the betrayal of that responsibility by either not intervening when warranted, or intervening in a thoughtless manner that endangered not only the people on the ground but the very status and power of the intervening state. 

Well I too began my academic career as a philosopher fascinated by history, but not the historical process as such, but the theories of explanation appropriate to undertaking historiography. There were two major competing views. In the tradition of Dilthey, Collingwood and my teacher, William Dray, the job of the historian was to get inside the heads of the agents in history to understand how their beliefs and values, goals and expectations led them to decide to do what they did. For those that wanted history to become more like a science, at the very time when the discipline of the history of science was being established to show that scientific explanation itself was rooted in history, the proper model of explanation for positivists such as Carl Hempel required subsuming actions and events under general laws that could account for why those events occurred. The first required a divine act that enabled one’s thoughts to get totally inside the mind of another and leave behind one’s own values and beliefs so that one adopted a perspective sub specie internitatis. The second required adopting a point of view that was sub specie aeternitatis, that looked down from the heavens to view the particularities of history as just instantiations of general and universal laws unaffected by the specificities of time and space. As I attempted to show in my initial academic publications on explanation in historiography​[9]​, the actual cases the scholars cited as illustrating their approach to historiography did not conform to the explanatory model that they themselves put forth. Rather, the examples seemed to indicate that history was not so much about explaining why an agent had to do what he in fact did, or why an action had to happen according to probabilistic laws, but how what was puzzling the historian and thus the reader could be solved. History dealt with conundrums and not with explaining the reasons or the causes of actions or events per se.

Why I so enjoyed reading Michael Ignatieff is that he saw history as a puzzle, what I had called incongruencies. Driven by the desire to resolve these puzzles, the job of the journalist or the historian was to engage in dialogue with agents (and with victims) of history to understand their perspective, not to determine why they had to do what they did, but to critique and explain why they could have done other than what they did. That required listening to them and recording honestly and accurately the perspective they had adopted, but then to subject that perspective to a critical examination. 

Michael Ignatieff is a strong opponent of ethnic nationalism. As I will describe in more detail later, he believes that ethnic nationalism is a prime root of conflict and not a foundation for finding security from violence. But as he listened to the victims of the violence of others, he also began to learn why they came to that belief and could come to no other belief. “’Genocide’ is a worn and debased term, casually hurled at every outrage, every violence, even applied to events where no death, only shame or abuse, occurs. But it is a word that does mean something: the project to exterminate a people for no other reason than because they are that people. Before the experience of genocide, a people may not believe they belong to a nation. Before genocide, they may believe it is a matter of personal choice whether they belong or believe. After genocide it becomes their fate.
Genocide and nationalism have an entwined history. It was genocide that convinced the Jews and even convinced the Gentile world that they were a people who would never be safe until they had a nation-state of their own.” (1993, p. 199) This was also true for the Kurds of northern Iraq who had suffered under the atrocities of Saddam Hussein. “But after seeing Halabja, you realize one thing very clearly: autonomy will never do. It is a stopping point along the way to destination. But it can never be the end of the road. For Halabja happened, and for a people who have known genocide, there is only one thing that will do: a nation-state of their own.” (op. cit.) Understanding the experience of immense trauma leads one to understand how the victims of that trauma could not trust themselves to the political will of another ever again, a choice that Michael would not make precisely because he did not and could not share the same experience. “This border region between Turkey and Iraq is where I finally learn the human difference between a people who have their own place and a people who do not. On one side, hearts and minds are open. On the other, hearts pound with fear. [The Kurds in Kurdish Iraq vs the Kurds in Turkey] …Statelessness is a state of mind, and it is akin to homelessness. This is what a nationalist understands: a people can become completely human, completely themselves, only when they have a place of their own.” (1993, p. 212)

Further, subsuming something under a law of necessity was not a positive goal of history but an escape from history and freedom for those who resorted to the dead end of fatalism. “It was in Vukovar that I began to see how nationalism works as a moral vocabulary of self-exoneration. No one is responsible for anything but the other side. In the moral universe of pure nationalist delusion, all action is compelled by tragic necessity. [My italics] Towns must be destroyed in order to liberate them. Hostages must be shot. Massacres must be undertaken. Why? Because the other side started it first. Because the other side are beasts and understand no language but violence and reprisal. And so on. Everyone in a nationalist war speaks in the language of fate, compulsion and moral abdication.” (1993, p. 45)
Thus, understanding the traumatized source of a nationalism that insists that safety can only be found within the ethnic self-determination of one’s own people and critical of the use of that same nationalism to deny external reality and paint oneself solely and purely as a victim of fate while demonizing the other, did not make one complacent with one’s own cosmopolitanism. Quite the reverse! This understanding provided a critical source for self-reflection for those who advocated abandoning nationalism altogether and a critique of those who remain nationalists. Michael’s solution was to support the move towards civic nationalism and away from ethnic nationalism, even for those who had suffered extreme trauma and had retreated into ethnic nationalism, but for them only after allowing sufficient decades to pass to heal their wounds and psyche. Thus, Germany’s task, for example, was not, “as some liberals suppose, to pass beyond nationalism altogether and move into bland Europeanism but instead to move from the ethnic nationalism of its past to the civic nationalism of a possible future. This could be the moment, in other words, to bury the idea of the German Volk forever. In practical terms, this would mean moving away from the identification with the nation toward identification with the state, i.e., away from a citizenship based on the fiction of ethnic identity toward one based on allegiance to the values of democracy. The chief obstacles to this enterprise lies, not with the ethnic minorities themselves, but with conservatives who dream of a Germany that has never existed and with liberals who suppose that patriotism is for fools.” (1993, p. 102)

It also meant developing an acute sense of self-critical awareness and honesty, in Michael’s case, of the roots of his own imperialist thinking. “My difficulty in taking Ukraine seriously​[10]​ goes deeper than just my cosmopolitan suspicion of nationalists everywhere. Somewhere inside, I’m also what Ukrainians would call a Great Russian, and there ids just a trace of old Russian disdain for these ‘little Russians’.” (1993, p. 108)

Michael Ignatieff’s method entailed empathy for the other without pretending to share the other’s experience or thoughts, a denunciation of historical necessitarian thinking and, therefore, fatalism as an escape from the responsibilities of freedom, critiques of those who retreated into nationalism when it was not justified, and self-criticism of one’s own rationalistic cosmopolitanism that left a vacuum in the soul of the hollow men who lacked a sense of belonging to a larger family.

What is wrong with this stand? Ignatieff has staked out a middle position of civic nationalism that rejects ethnic nationalism on the one hand and abstract detached rationalism on the other, that understands the need for ethnic nationalism as a response to post-traumatic stress disorder but not as a prospect for the future or in the present for those who lack an immediate historical memory of such suffering. The evaluation of ethnic nationalism as the root of all evil but abstract rationalism as an empty and inadequate response, structures the frame and leaves civic nationalism holding the moderate middle ground while some compassion is demonstrated for the ethnic nationalism of those who have been traumatized.  Any distortion does not arise from the abuse of the facts but from the normative analytical frame utilized. Since this is a substantive issue about nationalism and the view that civic nationalism is an intermediary position between bland Europeanism or cosmopolitanism and ethno-nationalist, though it is understandable if persecuted people retreat to ethno-nationalism, I will take up this issue later. I will also deal with his underlying propensity which he detected in himself for the Greater Russia project and, hence, imperialism. 

	But I want to deal with the methodological issues here. And there are three: 1) Michael’s ability to use what he finds to become self-critical of himself as when he revealed his repressed identity with the Greater Russia; 2) his approaching a problem or an interviewee from the perspective of empathy; and 3) his insistence that history is undertaken to foster and enhance choice rather than to slot events and actions into a deterministic framework, whether it be fatalism of the dictates of a reified past or covering historical explanatory laws. I applaud all three as important ingredients in the methodology of undertaking historical studies. They should push one to become self-critical of one’s long held beliefs and convictions, even making one aware that what was taken for granted and was unexamined needed re-thinking. Thus, I had always held, and written often enough, that you cannot have peace agreements without resolving the refugee issue, and that the resolution of the refugee issue was a necessary precondition for making peace. A comparative study of 16 cases ended up proving this presumption totally wrong.​[11]​

There is the second issue of empathy. Amos Oz, the Israeli writer, essayist and peace activist, following the announcement of the unofficial Geneva Accords negotiated between a group of Israelis and Palestinians​[12]​, gave a speech at Princeton University to a very large audience on November 10, 2003 entitled, “Israel: Between War and Peace.” In that speech he emphasized that the problem of the conflict in the area, without in any way surrendering the concerns and principles governing one’s own side, had to be approached by understanding the position of the other side, particularly the deep attachment of Palestinians to the land and the suffering that the refugees have undergone since 1948 without determining who is at fault. Michael Ignatieff did this in his dealings with Serbs, criticizing efforts to demonize them and insisting that their story had a right to be heard even if they might have been mostly at fault over the war in Bosnia and in Kosovo. Empathy does not mean getting inside their head so that you understand their position so much that you would draw the same conclusions they would. Ignatieff felt quite free to criticize the understandings they had and the conclusions they drew, but insisted that their voices be heard, that their positions were put forth as clearly as possible. This is proper empathy without turning oneself into a divine epistemological demon a la Dilthey, Collingwood and Dray. It is an approach I also applaud.

Finally, I also agree that the whole effort of engaging in historical understanding and fostering self criticism as well as criticism of the position of the other, while clearly demonstrating that you understand that position, is to escape the path of despair and fatalism, to enlarge the range of hope and of choice for the future.









In a letter to Robert Skidelsky​[13]​, dated May 4, 1999, Michael Ignatieff wrote: “I agree with you that there should be a general presumption in favor of state sovereignty in international affairs…I also accept that human rights abuses, by themselves, do not legitimize military intervention….I believe that armed intervention can only be justified in two instances: first, when human rights abuses rise to the level of a systematic attempt to expel or exterminate large numbers of people who have no means of defending themselves; second, where these abuses threaten the peace and security of neighboring states. Two further conditions should be added: first, all diplomatic alternatives must have been exhausted; second, force can only be justified when it stands a real chance of working…It must be a credible way to stop abuses and restore peace.” (2000, p. 76-7)​[14]​

	The last two are conditions for intervention that come straight out of just war doctrine, the principle of using coercive intervention as a last resort and only launching such an effort if there is a reasonable chance of success. The second instance justifying intervention – a threat to peace and security – is in fact a casus belli, and is so defined by the United Nations Charter. Further, the first instance – or part of it referring to expulsion of large numbers of citizens - is also a threat to the peace and security of its neighbors. It was the rationale for India declaring war on Pakistan when ten million Bengalis crossed its border into India. It was the rationale for the intervention in northern Iraq after the Gulf War when very large numbers of Kurds tried to flee across the border into Turkey. 

In fact, Ignatieff offers two cases justifying intervention – a threat to peace and security of which there are four different sub-types: the violation of nonproliferation protocols re weapons of mass destruction (the rationale for the 2003 war against Iraq); when states harbor or fail to stop terrorists targeting one’s own country (the rationale for the invasion of Afghanistan); when a state drive its own citizens in large numbers across borders, thereby destabilizing a region (as when the Kurds were driven into Turkey until Turkey closed the border), and, finally, when states are victims of aggression as in the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The second case is when a state attempts to exterminate a group of its citizens, though Ignatieff sometimes adds a third instance: when democracy is overthrown and the people call for intervention.

In that intervention, Ignatieff offers up a doctrine of conflict management where the enemies are characterized as terrorists. A doctrine of victorious war is only proposed when the enemy would continue to constitute a threat to international peace and security. In that case, the enemy must be defeated. In a war on terror, containing rather than defeating the enemy is the most that can be hoped for. Success means stopping the fighting, not defeating one’s enemy. 

Secondly, it is a doctrine that endorses pre-emption, but pre-emption triggered only by a certain level of threat either to the peace and security of neighbors or to a minority population within the state.
Thirdly, pre-emptive intervention may be taken even when the evidence is murky, as is the case with the threat of terrorism, but it is incumbent under the principle of clarity to articulate what degree of certainty and uncertainty is necessary to trigger pre-emptive action

Fourth, do not lie. Do not say the reason for the intervention was the necessity of meeting a real and imminent threat when the threat was a possible and not even a probable one, and where the evidence even for that was at best murky, as it generally is when dealing with possible worlds.

Fifth, Michael implies that pre-emptive and unilateral intervention can even be justified in terms of the real motives he discerns, maintaining hegemonic power in the Gulf region as “the guarantor of stable oil supplies for the Western economy”, but only when such goals are clearly articulated; Michael is no proponent of creative equivocation, the sacred principle of any diplomat, even though his father (or perhaps because his father) was a diplomat. Clarity about goals, about costs and about an exit strategy, are all critical. Further, principle must be underpinned with interests; Bush’s failure is that he is not a realist, but rather a “hotblooded moralist”.

Sixth, the war must be defined as a war of necessity in which America’s place in the world is at stake (versus simply fighting terrorism) rather than a war of choice (one fought simply for moral reasons) such as for the cause of nation building.

Seven, Michael insists on a doctrine of postwar multilateralism and shared power and shared rules to constrain America in the future to counteract unilateral pre-emptive action.

Eight, the latter point requires reform of the UN, including the restructuring of the Security Council and the surrender of the veto, not a very likely prospect in my estimation, even if Kofi Anan has made it a priority.





In the case of the American-led coalition against Iraq, ostensibly for accumulating weapons of mass destruction, “what the war has been about --was never simply a matter of preventing the use of weapons of mass destruction.” (2003b)​[15]​ The primary goal of the war is, as has been a history of past interventions, increasing America’s power and influence in the world, and in particular, in the Gulf region, because the status quo in military, political and economic terms was untenable and a revolution in power in the region was necessary. Thus, the real motive [my italics] was imperial stretching of power and economic domination in the region. Ignatieff followed his intellectual guru, Isaiah Berlin, who “rejoiced in worldliness, in having some grasp of the inner workings of the world of power and influence, in knowing the gossip, in understanding what low motives actually did make the world turn. ‘Worldliness’, in his lexicon, became synonymous with having that ‘sense of reality’ which most intellectuals and dons conspicuously lacked.” (1998, p. 63) Americans had always been an imperial power and at this time an imperial people has awakened to the menace of the barbarians. The goals of the war were explicitly imperial: “not simply to enforce international law, not merely to control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, but to wipe out the leader of Arab rejectionism and go on to reorder the political map of the Middle East on American terms.” (2003a, p. 5) Ignatieff’s criticism does not focus on the imperial aims but on the absence of a clear statement of national interest and those aims, even if the imperial nature of the project remains disguised, though earlier his criticism of the containment policy focused primarily on the failure to prevent Saddam Hussein from accumulating weapons of mass destruction.​[16]​

There is no mention here of extensive abuse of human rights by the Saddam Hussein regime even though Ignatieff had written only three years earlier that armed intervention could only be justified in cases of extensive violations of human rights leading to mass flight or extermination, or, secondly, where these abuses threaten the peace and security of neighboring states. Even if the case of threats to peace and security of neighboring states is expanded to include possible threats from terrorists or weapons of mass destruction, and neighborhood is interpreted very widely, even then intractable further conditions had to be fulfilled, such as the exhaustion of all diplomatic alternatives. Gulf War II was not launched as the only credible way to stop abuses of the citizens of Iraq, though the victory did achieve that target. (2000, p. 76-7)





 “Nobody likes empires, but there are some problems for which there are only imperial solutions” (Virtual War, 2003a, 11); it was American military power which made nation-building possible in the first place.​[17]​ However, “The problem with the new imperialism…is not that it is imperial, i.e. it uses force and power to reorder the world. The problem is that those who believe in the use of imperial means do not practice what they preach. We say we believe in self-determination, and we confiscate all power into our own hands; we say we respect local cultures and traditions, and yet we are often as contemptuous, behind the locals’ backs, as the imperialists of old. Finally, we say we are going top stay the course, when we are always looking for the exit. Nation-building should be an exercise in solidarity between the rich and poor, the possessors and the dispossessed. Too often, it is an exercise in mutual betrayal.” (Virtual War, 2003a, 25)

The issue is not the failure to use of overwhelming force given the Rumsfeld doctrine of war that has replaced the Powell doctrine, but the failure to deploy adequate forces to secure the peace as well as to accompany that use of force with empowering the people, respecting local culture, and the will and determination to see the initiative through to the end. The military strategy must match the full objectives of the intervention. As Ignatieff has written, “Any military or humanitarian intervention amounts to a moral promise to persons in need. If we make promises of this sort, we owe it to ourselves and those we intend to help to devise the military strategy, rules of engagement, and chain of command necessary to make good on our promises.” (Human Rights, 2002a, 44) But even these instrumental factors are insufficient, for another is necessary - the action must be covered with a patina of moral rectitude. “Nation-building would lack all soulfulness if it were just about creating stability in zones important to Western interests. The idea that redeems nation-building is the spiritual component, assisting former enemies to reconcile, to bind up their wounds and transcend a painful past. This is what gives the imperial project its moral allure.” (Empire Lite 2003a, 32) The moral patina had to be reconciliation among the various ethnic and religious groups of Iraq as well as of Afghanistan.

Let’s examine these five elements in more detail. For Ignatieff, the war was fought with minimal forces using lightning tactics sufficient to win the initial large battle but insufficient to establish the monopoly on violence afterwards.​[18]​ Overwhelming force was not required to defeat Saddam Hussein. Ignatieff supported Rumfeld’s strategic war doctrine: “air-lifted maneuver-based warfare by lightly armed squads, working in and around enemy lines, to call in high precision fires from navaland spaced based assets.” (Empire Lite 2003a, 175-6). This was backed by precision guidance targeting the nerve centers of the regime. “Instead of attrition, the aim of post-modern warfare is to strike at the nerve centers – command posts, computer networks – which direct the war -machine. A blinded enemy – without computers, telephone or power – may still have forces capable of attack, but he no longer has the capacity to order them into battle.” (Virtual War 2000a, 169) But there were two flaws in the execution. The US lacked sufficient joint, mobile, rapidly deployable expeditionary forces necessary for the task. Secondly, much larger forces were required to secure the peace afterwards and ensure that America and its allies retained the monopoly on violence. The reasons those flaws were there was because: “Precision violence is now at the disposal of a risk-averse culture, unconvinced by the language of military sacrifice, skeptical about the costs of foreign adventures and determined to keep out of harm’s way.” (Virtual War 2000a, 163) There is an incompatibility between an imperial war to secure power and expand interests and a risk-averse culture backing it up. There is a moral incompatibility as well between the objectives for the people on the ground and the actual results.​[19]​ 

In addition to the issue of how military power is employed, there is the issue of people power. How do you empower the people? Not by using puppets. “Whenever there is a peacekeeping operation, in the zones of ethnic war, a diligent search is always made for ‘moderates’, that is, a local leadership who can be made to do the bidding of the international interveners. Their dilemma as local leaders is that the more pliable they are to the will of the internationals. The less credibility they have with their local population, and the less use they ultimately prove to be to the internationals. The international community does not want to rule through puppets, since puppets will never last. The trouble is that puppets are usually all they can find.” (Empire Lite 2003a, 50) The problem is that Ignatieff never spells out who can be used. If moderates are not used, then you cannot empower the people since militants operate by controlling them. 

Ignatieff offers only a very general formula: In the conflict, a balance must be found between the imperial interests of the intervening powers, chiefly the Americans, and the local interests of the people and their leadership to rule themselves. “The essential paradox of nation-building is that temporary imperialism – empire lite – has become the necessary condition for democracy in countries torn apart by civil war.” (Empire Lite 2003a, vii) The locals need the imperial power and the imperial power has to empower the local population. All Ignatieff can do is offer a rule of thumb: “managing the essential contradiction [between imperial power and local self-government] is the whole art of the modern imperium: building institutions for the sake of the local people, without confiscating their decision-making capacity; forcing them to take responsibility without abandoning them to the demons of their past.” (Empire Lite 2003a, 114) Further, he also offers a focus – on the rule of law. “The right strategy, at least if the Balkans is anything to go by, is to build in checks and balances from the start by helping the Afghans to rewrite the criminal and civil code and train a new generation of lawyers, prosecutors, judges and criminal investigators. Without these legal foundations, no country can make the transition from a war economy to a peace economy.” (Empire Lite 2003a, 102) And a structure: “Federalism is not a political ideology. It is just a particular way of sharing political power among different peoples within a state. But it is nationalism’s political antithesis…Federalism is a politics that seeks to reconcile two competing principles: the ethnic principle, according to which people wished to be ruled by their own, with the civic principle, according to which strangers wish to come together to form a community of equals, based not on ethnicity but on citizenship.” (Blood and Belonging 1993a, 146)

Third, how do you respect the local culture if the vast majority of troops employed do not speak Arabic and are not even Islamic? If the Turks are invited in, the Iraqis understandably become very upset and finally assert their power to veto the idea. For Ignatieff, this too should have been done using overwhelming force to secure the peace and thereby prevent the looting, particularly of the national museum treasures, and the killing of local clergy.

Fourth, the contradictions between the need for military forces to secure the peace and the demands of democracies for the least exposure to risk, for supporting self-government while ensuring the security of the imperial power, are not easily overcome. “Nation-building is the kind of imperialism you get in a human rights era, a time when great powers believe simultaneously in the right of small nations to govern themselves and in their own right to rule the world. Nation-building lite is supposed to reconcile these principles: to safeguard American interests in Central Asia at the lowest possible cost and to give Afghanistan back a stable government of its own choosing. These principles of imperial power and self-determination are not easy to reconcile. The empire wants quick results, at the lowest possible cost. That means an early exit. The Afghans want us to protect them, and at the same time help them back on their feet. That means sticking around for awhile.” (Empire Lite 2003a, 106) However, “Empires cannot be maintained over the long term by a people always looking for the exit.” (Empire Lite 2003a, 90) The will to persist and stay in for the long haul is a prerequisite. Bosnia-Herzegovina does not provide the proper model for there, “International disillusionment is palpable. Instead of flowing towards reconstruction, much of the international money has ended up in the wrong pockets…Throughout Bosnia, rule of law is next to non-existent, because there are still no independent prosecutors, judges or lawyers. Mostar is still ruled by people who rose to power during the years of war and madness.” (Empire Lite 2003a, 37) The limited involvement in Desert Storm that necessitated Gulf War II arose because of our desire for a quick exit and in Somalia a quick exit became the battle cry. (Warrior’s Honor 1997b, 93) These are not examples to follow. But how do you overcome the fact that democracies tend to be risk averse, especially when fighting wars perceived to be imperial in character? “The impatience [demanding quick exit strategies] has complex roots – the short attention span of modern media, the competing interests of the condominium of powers who pay for these imperial exercises – but the central factor has to be the democratic character of the western powers. “ (Empire Lite 2003a, 115) Whatever the roots of a risk-averse society and the desire to get out quickly, if the lessons of the past colonial policies of Britain in Egypt and Iraq, and the French ones in Lebanon are precedents, then the United States is in for a very long haul. Further, and even more disconcerting, the creation of a viable independent sovereign state may not be obtainable.

Fifth, where does the moral patina come from? For Ignatieff, the pattern was set in the first war of humanitarian intervention to protect the Kurds, and it was put in place by an NGO. Kouchner “is a master of making his fellow citizens ashamed, too shrewd not to know that the effect is momentary and must be constantly renewed, with more images, more shocking scenes, more of the soft-core pornography of suffering on which modern humanitarian fund-raising now depends. He also understands politicians, and knows that getting the money depends on making them feel morally uneasy, at least for a moment or two. It is Kouchner, more than anyone else, who created the modern European relation between civic compassion, humanitarian action and the media. Where Kouchner led with Médecins Sans Frontières, all modern humanitarian agencies now follow.” (Empire Lite 2003a, 61)

The moral patina is created by triangulating civic compassion, humanitarian action and the media in restricted regions where, “Empires that are successful learn to ration their service to moral principle to the few strategic zones where the defense of principle is simultaneously the defense of a vital interest, and where the risks do not outweigh the benefits.” (Empire Lite 2003a, 111) Further, the moral patina is neither just wrapping paper nor, on the other hand, the be all and end all of the exercise. The moral purposes have to be integrated with the interests and cannot remain disconnected. Unfortunately, as far as Michael Ignatieff is concerned, Bush Jr. is a hot-blooded moralist. The moral cover is divorced from interests. Michael wants the goal of bringing freedom to the Iraqi people integrated with American interests, and both suitably synchronized with a clearly articulated strategy and tactics

How do you pull off that triangulation of civic compassion, humanitarian action and the media. By continually uncovering one mass grave after another? Not necessarily. The answer requires a deeper understanding of the role of the media and the politics of sentiment, for without it, the democratic forces at home will demand a quick exit when faced with the rising demands for local power along with the greater sacrifice of troops because of the failure to secure the monopoly of violence with sufficient forces in the first place. 

First, television is a fickle and cynical medium. “[T]he dominant ethics in television today is that there are no good causes left – only victims of bad causes.”  (Warrior’s Honor 1997b, 23) – In that context, the media will easily and readily succumb to the next moral fashion, the next story of mass victimization, whether by terrorists or oppressors. And if there is no alternative crisis to which the media can flee, the media will simply engender despair about human behavior so that no morality whatsoever is worth the effort and sacrifice. 

However, there is an even worse outcome if the media cannot find another crisis of victimization. “Where empathy fails to find the blameless victim, the conscience finds comfort in shallow misanthropy.” (Warrior’s Honor 1997b, 24) “Television has unfortunate strengths as a medium of moral disgust. As a moral mediator between violent men and the audiences whose attention they crave, television images are more effective at presenting consequences than in exploring intentions; more adept at pointing out the corpses than in explaining why violence may, in certain places, pay so well. As a result, television now bears some responsibility for that generalized misanthropy, that irritable resignation toward the criminal folly of fanatics and assassins, which legitimizes one of the dangerous cultural moods of our time – the feeling that the world has become too crazy to deserve serious reflection.” (Warrior’s Honor 1997b, 25)​[20]​





How do you combine all these elements – a goal of enhancing interests and securing imperial power with a moral purpose, protection of the power and interests of the imperium while building democracy and empowering the people in the state in which the intervention takes place, using small rapid action forces to win the large battles with needing a much larger occupation army to secure the peace and resist the resistors, the need to demonstrate that forces are needed to fight demon enemies while celebrating the richness and depth of the culture that gave birth to these demons, the need to stay the course while responding to a low-risk tolerance in the domestic civil society, and the need to communicate all of this on a medium which is fickle and has a short attention span, but, what is worse, feeds despair and misanthropy when the civil society needs to be inspired by hope?

Ignatieff argues that the process can only be tackled sequentially by first ensuring the monopolization of coercive force, creating a viable market society and then creating the bureaucracy of a modern state governed by the rule of law and leaving the process of democratization down the line. The only problem is that the real sequence is an absence of a monopoly on the use of force that puts a real damper on local capital investment, a demand for local empowerment in the face of the insecurity without having the time to build a bureaucracy rooted in the rule of law. If a viable and legitimate state cannot be built without developing the domestic internal economy which, in a globalized economic world, requires foreign investment in partnership with local entrepreneurs, a direction which is bound to arouse the fears of nationalists and local entrepreneurs that they are simply being made into a satrap of an economic empire, that investment will not be forthcoming in sufficient quantities from the private sector unless the monopoly on violence is well established, especially in the context of an economy under military authority that is the closest the West has to a Stalin command economy that inevitably is handicapped by cronyism and fraud. Thus, in addition to dealing with the series of conundrums set forth in the discussion of means, the process of connecting ends and means reveals a new set of contradictions, the first one between the needs and nature of military occupation and the requirements and urgent need for building a viable economy.  

Further, because there is absence of a monopoly on the use of violence, the military begin to suspect everyone. The average Iraqi is “racially profiled”, stripped of his or her identity while the family, the tribe, the elders and all the local sources of moral authority are made impotent. In an atmosphere of increasing fear, the ordinary citizen must choose between placing his/her trust on the good will and charity of foreigners or relying on local and increasingly militant forces, now made more fiery by militarized and militant spirituality.

Because the Hobbesian problem of fear and insecurity has not been solved, another dimension of that fear is enhanced. Not only is the antipathy of soldier and citizen enhanced, but, in a multiethnic society, each group retreats to its own kind for security, a process that undercuts the desire to enhance individualism, reduce ethnic nationalism and establish norms of tolerance. As Ignatieff puts it: “Even the long-standing, apparently adamantine antipathies of the ethnic war zones turn out, on closer examination, to be expressions of fear created by the collapse or absence of institutions that enable individuals to form civic identities strong enough to counteract their ethnic allegiances. When individuals live in stable states – even poor ones – they do not need to rush to the protection of the group. It is the disintegration of states, and the Hobbesian fear that results, that produces ethic fragmentation and war.” (Warrior’s Honor 1997b, 7)​[21]​

The insecurity not only undermines the prospects for capital investment, not only enhances the antagonism and suspicion between local residents and foreign soldiers, not only enhances ethnic and religious loyalties that undermine the quest for tolerance, but stimulates a search for short term comforts and the quest for happiness through the acquisition of material goods when what is needed is the frugality of producers who develop the discipline of self-restraint and self-improvement instead of the pursuit of ephemeral baubles. This manic hedonistic quest, with its propensity to fostering short cuts and even fraud and theft in order to worship at the feet of the idol of money, becomes a display that pushes a conservative society to reviving the values of Islamic virtue and self-denial that, in fact, also undercut the development of a viable commercial and consumer economy. The traditional values of virtue, enhanced by the inculcation of religion, ends up partnering with its foe, corruption, to undercut the individualism and principle of individual conscience at the heart of the market economy as the virtuous serve the needs of the poor and the unemployed and uphold their claims and thrust them into the shamefaced visages of the believers who uphold the importance of the imperium and the productivity of the global market economy. Thus, the failure to establish a successful monopoly of force and the consequent insecurity undermines the envisaged sequencing in building a nation-state.

This is not helped when “Nation-building seeks to reconcile imperial power and local self-determination through the medium of an exit strategy. This is imperialism in a hurry: to spend money, to get results, to turn the place back to the locals and get out.” (Empire Lite 2003a, 22) All of these factors, fed by the initial failure to establish a monopoly of the control of violence, enhance the propensity to seek to get out at the earliest possible date. It is not the best scenario, to say the least, for a step-by-step process of moving towards a peace agreement.





E.	The Rationale – Reasons and Causes

The issue of all these conundrums takes us back to the causes of and the reasons offered for going into Iraq in the first place. The United States supported Iraq in its war against Iran but when Iraq invaded Kuwait, American-led forces intervened and reversed the occupation on the universally accepted principle opposing aggression of one state of the UN against another, but without seeking regime change. The Americans did not intervene to support the Shiite uprising against the Baath regime in Baghdad but it did intervene to set up a no-fly zone to protect the Kurds in the north as a clear case of humanitarian intervention even though self interest in a stable Turkey was a critical factor. In this latest 2003 intervention, built on the back of the war against terrorism and the ostensible intention of eliminating weapons of mass destruction from Iraq, the much smaller American ‘coalition of the willing’ set out to topple the Saddam Hussein regime altogether, but not the dismantling of the integrity of the state. Further, because both the rationale and the strategy were not seen to be credible, the coalition of the willing was not just smaller; it was a virtual coalition of the willing. In Ignatieff’s eyes, America squandered its moral capital that had been enhanced after 911 by not obtaining a significant coalition of the willing.​[22]​

However, it was not only the goals and the strategy that were suspect. Possible partners feared the unintended consequences, consequences that Michael Ignatieff took to be inevitable. If “after seeing Halabja, you realize one thing very clearly: autonomy will never do. It is a stopping point along the way to destination. But it can never be the end of the road. For Halabja happened, and for a people who have known genocide, there is only one thing that will do: a nation-state of their own,” (Blood and Belonging 1993a, 199) then the effect of regime change is to propel the forces of secession, in spite of the rhetorical support for maintaining the integrity of Iraq. The Kurd quest for an independent state may be on the back burner for now, but if the security situation begins to spin out of control, two radically opposite forces will come into play, the quest for secession – from the south as well as the north – and the desire for one ethnic group to seek hegemony over the others. 

Given such a drastic scenario that will result in the precise opposite of the goals of the intervention, it is well to revisit the causes and the reasons for seeking regime change in Iraq. The causes were self-interest – the security of the power of the American hegemon and the fostering of its interests. The ostensible reasons were the elimination of weapons of mass destruction. As Ignatieff wrote: “The rationale is moral; the motive is realpolitick.” (NYT Magazine 2003b) So we have the emergence of a doctrine of unilateral intervention intent on regime change but for an ostensible moral purpose – to prevent an evil regime from utilizing weapons of mass destruction or possibly providing them to terrorists. If the weapons had been found, the moral purpose would have successfully camouflaged the self-interest one. Instead, the reverse has happened. So there is a scramble to substitute new moral principles. Bush harps now on Saddam Hussein’s massive human rights violations as a justification for war even if propelled by hegemonic interests. However, the accounts of the Bush regime are increasingly interpreted as fraudulent and not just mistaken. As much as the government attempts to play up the horrors of the Saddam Hussein regime, the suspicion that one’s own side deliberately lied to foster its imperial agenda grows thereby undercutting trust in any moral patina to help ensure the intervention succeeds. Iganatieff required intervention to be accompanied by a moral cover, even when vital national interests are at stake. The American people want interests to be backed by principle, if not a righteous principle, at least a disinterested one. (NYT Magazine 2003b) Without that, an enormous extra weight has been placed on the side of failure.





Thus, there is a long-term dilemma. According to Ignatieff’s Hobbes/Locke sequential scenario for building the foundations of a viable state, there are two possible scenarios for avoiding the dreaded outcome of a failed state given the initial failures to establish a hegemony and monopoly on violence and the subsequent after-effects. Two necessary and jointly sufficient conditions have to be in place. One is a threat from outsiders. In the other, one segment of the population achieves hegemony over the other segments, thus clearly undermining the possibility of a democratic multi-ethnic state in Iraq. Since it is unlikely that the Kurds could achieve this, either the Sunni or the Shia would seek internal hegemony, and either of these would only succeed in the face of an external threat. If the lessons of the past colonial policies of Britain in Egypt and Iraq, and the French ones in Lebanon are to be taken as precedents, then not only is the United States in for a very long haul, but the end point of that long haul will not be the creation of a viable independent sovereign multi-ethnic democratic state. It will either be a state which has fragmented into at least three parts, a Kurdish ethnic nationalist state in the north, a Sunni state in the middle and a Shiite one in the south. Alternatively, if Turkish fears of such a precedent drive it to threaten Iraq, then either the Sunni minority or the Shiite majority will seek hegemony.

How can either scenario be avoided? One path requires reconciliation among the three large ethnic groups. Without going into a long disquisition​[23]​, this requires that four foundations be put in place: a) establishing the truth about the past and acknowledgement of responsibility so that a common national narrative can be constructed; b) ensuring justice for the perpetrators of past crimes, a reasonable possibility while the United States retains control over Iraq except for the fact that if the trials for past criminal acts are not carried out properly – which first requires the training of investigators, prosecutors and an independent judiciary – the results will only be viewed as victor’s justice; c) a system of compensation for those who suffered losses under the long tyranny of Saddam Hussein; and, finally, d) a process of forgiveness so that the three dominant ethnic groups can establish a society in which mutual tolerance is an integral element.

Let us start with the first. “[N]ations cannot hope to hold together if they do not come to some common – and truthful - version of their past.” However, as Ignatieff continued, “there are nations with pasts so hard to share together that they need centuries for forgetting to do its work. To ask for truth, to ask for shared truth, might be to ask for too much.”​[24]​ (Blood and Belonging 1993, 35) Can the United States be expected to stay in Iraq for decades as it stayed in the much more homogeneous societies of Germany and Japan for decades? Not very likely!

Is there an alternative to the process of reconciliation? “[L]iberal interventionists go into these zones with pieties about the healing virtues of truth and the moral necessity of justice when sometimes what these societies need is forgetting. We begin with the psychoanalytic virtues of truth; they have learned the necessity of repression.” (Warrior’s Honor 1997b, 7) The alternative is repression of truth, repression of justice, repression of the possibility of compensation for the victims of past injustices and, most of all, forgetting about mutual forgiveness. It means creating a society in which one group achieves hegemony in Iraq as a whole and surrendering the possibility of creating a democratic multi-ethnic state based on tolerance and the rule of law. A second alternative – nor very likely given the fears of neighbors – is to create three different states. In either of these alternatives, the vision of nation-building and creating a demonstration project for the rest of the Arab world goes out the window.

In the long term, what makes the possibility of following the scenario needed to create a democratic multi-ethnic state based on recollection, truth, justice, fairness and mutual understanding is that the very process, which requires a long term presence of the United States – highly unlikely according to the Ignatieff scenario given the other factors already unleashed in Iraq by the strategy of conquest already followed – is that the very process of reconciliation would depend on turning against the United States as a result of uncovering it, and the British role, in upholding the Saddam Hussein regime, especially in the years when Iraq was at war with Iran. Even more seriously, the process would require revealing the responsibility of sanctions – quite aside from the corruption of Saddam Hussein’s regime – for the horrific nineties and the drastic fall in the standard of living and rise in rates of mortality in Iraq in the nineties. Thus, the path of remembrance and reconciliation is highly unlikely, and, instead, the inertial path of forgetting is by far the more likely scenario. “[C]harity unleashed by empathy is a form of forgetting, the reproduction of amnesia about the responsibility of the West for the causes of famine and war.” (Warrior’s Honor 1997b, 16)







According to Ignatieff, these disastrous alternative scenarios of the aftermath could possibly have been avoided if a number of elements had been put in place before going to war and intervening in the internal affairs of Iraq. First, a long term proposition – not a quick exit vision - needed to be clearly and coherently articulated and defended lest it be undercut by American public opinion unwilling to bear the costs. (NYT Magazine 2003c) For Ignatieff, the closest precedent for the Iraq war is Teddy Roosevelt’s war in the Philippines that made America a Pacific power. (NYT Magazine 2003c) Further, such a possibility was fully consistent with American history. In spite of “George Washington's call to avoid foreign entanglements and John Quincy Adams's plea that America should abjure slaying monsters abroad,” Americans have shown not only a pattern of active intervention, but a deep cultural belief that America has a mission as the new one on the block destined to save the old world.​[25]​ Ignatieff is selective in his choice of examples. But there are far more than the one he cites. Where other more powerful countries at the time equivocated, Americans intervened to stop the Barbary pirates who were sabotaging shipping in the beginning of the nineteenth century. 

Further, Ignatieff distinguishes between the motive for intervention and the rationale. “American foreign policy largely consists of doctrines about when and where to intervene in other people's countries,” citing the Monroe Doctrine of regional protective hegemony over the Americas against extra-hemispheric interventions and the extension of that doctrine by Theodore Roosevelt of intervening in cases of “flagrant wrongdoing” by governments in Latin America, all ostensibly rationales for advancing American interests. (NYT Magazine 2003c) The motives for intervention were always extending American power and protecting its interests, but in successful efforts, the rationale always had a moral flavor. For Ignatieff, isolationism has been the exception rather than the rule for America, and an unsuccessful one at that given America’s propensity to be a world power. (NYT Magazine 2003c)

Thus, the problems begin before the war against Iraq was even launched. Quite aside from the bad choice of strategies in fighting the war leading to the failure to establish a monopoly of violence once in Iraq, terrible precedents had already been set indicating that the Bush administration did not understand America’s imperial past or the precedents for the American imperial mission. Thus, the failures in execution were all compounded by the specific failures of the Bush administration prior to the invasion, primarily inconsistency and lack of clarity if not total confusion as indicated by:
1. intervening in Liberia where no vital interests at stake;
2. intervening for nation-building in Afghanistan and Iraq when he had ruled such goals out in his presidential campaign;
3. though Bush “called for a focused intervention strategy, he has proclaimed a war on terror that never clearly defines terrorism; never differentiates among terrorist organizations as to which explicitly threaten American interests and which do not; and never has settled on which states supporting or harboring terrorists are targets of American intervention”;​[26]​ 
4. confused messages, as when the intervention list might include Syria or Iran
-- or might not, depending on the day of the week you ask; 
5. the conflation of terrorism and the nuclear threat from rogue nations;
6. the deluded promise of swift and decisive interventions that will lead to victory;
7. the claim that intervention was necessary to meet a real and imminent threat when at best (or at worst) America faced only a possible (and not even a probable) threat;
8. the moral claim that the intent of the war was to get rid of an odious regime, when the Bush administration ran for office on a plank of avoiding moral wars and wars of choice. 

In other words, American intervention in Iraq is running contrary to all past practices of intervention. Intervention is not wrong according to Michael Ignatieff. Trying to be and remain the biggest and only superpower is not wrong. The goals, strategy and tactics of intervention are what is wrong. And most of all, the rationale is confused, contradictory and initially lacked the patina of moral purpose. The 1990 interventions all had a moral rationale: “America in the 1990's intervened to oust an invader (the first gulf war), to stop civil war (Bosnia), to stop ethnic cleansing (Kosovo)​[27]​, to feed the starving (Somalia) and to prevent a country from falling apart (Macedonia).” (NYT Magazine 2003c) The moral patina only became an afterthought in Iraq following the failure to uncover weapons of mass destruction. 

For a successful intervention in Iraq, a number of prior steps would have been required. First, understanding America’s past and the precedents for intervention. Second, clarity of purpose in which nation-building would not have been part of the scenario. Third, clear acknowledgment of America’s imperial mission. Fourth, the process would have required educating the American population about the long term costs and sacrifices involved so that domestic support and full consent could have been behind the project. Fifth, America needed allies; the project needed to be multilateral for America could not engage in such an enterprise fraught with potholes without wide international support. Without virtual consent by both the UN and by the domestic population, the result is “The decay of institutional checks and balances on the war-making power of the executive” (Virtual War 2000a, 181), which, in turn, results in a weakened capacity for a head of state in the United States to conduct wars of intervention required if the United States is to fulfill its mission in the world.

Of course, not only does the intervention in Iraq require a long-term commitment in advance; to put in pace the requirements of the prelude would itself have taken years if not decades. “One lesson of the conflict is that there needs to be a renewal of both national and international institutions with the power to ratify the decision to go to war. In the case of national parliaments, committee powers of review must be strengthened and legislatures must insist that military operations receive their formal approval. In the case of the UN, the Security Council must be reformed: enlarged so that it can become more representative of the world’s populations and restructured so as to replace the veto system of the Permanent Five with majority voting.” (Virtual War 2000a , 182)

Instead, America launched an intervention in Iraq based on virtual​[28]​ mobilization both in terms of money and troops, with a vision of virtual victory based on virtual alliances and virtual values. Instead of an intervention deeply rooted in reality and realism, the intervention was launched with none of the pillars so necessary to success in place. Is it any wonder that the results are increasingly seen to be a nightmare?

H.	The Conditions and Just War Theory

The necessary preconditions for a successful intervention were not put in place. The vision of what was needed after the invasion was not realistic. The military strategy in executing the intervention was very successful in terms of winning the opening battle and overthrowing the Saddam Hussein regime, but very unsuccessful in terms of establishing the first and fundament premise for long term success – ensuring the monopoly on political violence. However, there were other factors that continue to plague the project based on an inadequate understanding of the role that ethics and morality play in the execution of even imperial ventures. Recall, that intervention in Michael Ignatieff’s doctrine requires a moral patina. The moral patina focuses on a moral vision of hope at the end of the exercise. However, the intervention also requires that ethical boundaries guide the enterprise. These are a variation of just war theory.

Briefly, an intervention by one state or set of states into the internal affairs of another state through military coercion is a war. Just war theory sets down the ethical parameters within which such a war should be fought, both concerning the legitimate grounds for fighting such a war and the means used to execute the war. Rather than the theoretical premises discussed above, these are historical conditions based on a presumed established body of rules over time governing the conduct of war and embodied in agreements such as the Geneva and Hague Conventions.

One premise underlying the ethical parameters for conducting such wars is based on the premise that they are inter-state wars and, further, that the two sides are roughly symmetrical. Though the American-led intervention in Iraq conforms to the first requirement, the two sides were radically asymmetrical, not only because the cultures of the two countries were so radically different in terms of religion and ethnicity, but because, on the one hand, the Saddam Hussein regime was such a ruthless force that made any discussion of ethics moot, and, on the other hand, the United States was a military superpower and Iraq was a shadow of itself when it was a regional power. However, for Ignatieff, this did not relieve the United States from conducting its intervention according to ethical norms, if only because without those norms, there was no realistic possibility of the United States winning anything more than a military victory. The issue was not military escalation but the prerequisites for a peaceful order after the fighting ended. A modern version of a warrior’s code to replace and displace the warrior code of clans and ethno-nationalist or religious fanatics was required.

Just war theorists distinguish between rules governing the just basis for initiating a war in the first place (jus ad bellum) and rules governing the conduct of the war itself (jus in bello). The just basis for war entails just cause, the requirement of a legitimate authority to declare war, the rectitude of the intention, the reasonable prospect of success, and adoption of means proportional to the end task. The final guide of jus ad bellum overlaps with those governing the conduct of war itself - jus in bello – where the principle of proportionality applies to the quantity of force that is ethically appropriate to achieve the objectives. The other jus in bello rule sets forth the legitimate targets of the war. I will discuss the Ignatieff ethical parameters of war under the same headings: just cause, legitimate authority; the rectitude of the intention, the prospect of success, and the adoption of proportional means as well as the application of proportionality and discrimination to the conduct of the war itself.  

With regards to just cause, a policy of war requires a goal, and that goal must be proportional to the other principles of just cause. Whilst this commonly entails the minimizing of war's destruction, it can also invoke general balance of power considerations. However, in this context, the goal was to take the initiative and, through pre-emption, deny terrorists any possible source of access to weapons of mass destruction while, at the same time, engage in state-building so that the character of a democratic state in the Arab world would provide a beacon and a witness for other Arab states. However, the majority who spoke in Iraq did not trust the ostensible American motives for being in Iraq, that is, to build democracy and restore the economy. Saddam had left them a Soviet-style command economy, hobbled by cronyism and crooks, self-indulgence and grandiloquent display. Integrating Iraq into a global market economy could benefit Iraqis, and Ignatieff saw the pre-emptive attack as an effort to stabilize the region by making a example of Saddam Hussein. 

However, the domestic economic and political policies seemed at odds with the goal of building an economically viable state within the global economy controlled by the American imperium. Even if a genuine effort was made to reconcile these goals, there did seem to be an imbalance in both power and commitment between the domestic agenda within Iraq and securing and extending the imperial power of the USA. Thus, according to Michael, the Iraq war failed to meet the first just war condition in terms of cause. Regime change is an entirely legitimate objective. 

With respect to legitimate authority, Tony Blair was correct in pursuing a multilateral strategy under the UN umbrella. “Americans cannot operate a global empire without European diplomatic and economic cooperation. The empire needs legitimacy, and multilateral support is a useful cover.​[29]​ European participation in peacekeeping, nation-building and humanitarian reconstruction is so important that the Americans are required, even when they are unwilling to do so, to include Europeans in the governance of their evolving imperial project.” (Empire Lite 2003a, 16) Bush’s unilateralist effort meant that his efforts to enlist the UN were halfhearted attempts to appease Powell and that domestic constituency rather than a genuine effort to ensure that the Iraq intervention was conducted under a more universal mandate and global formal authority. This does not mean acceding to European and UN supremacy. Quite the reverse: it means using multilateralism and the legitimation that the UN can provide to advance American power and interests. “Humanitarians know that there are some humanitarian problems for which there are only imperial solutions. This forces them to be, like the European states, unwilling and unhappy accomplices of the imperial project.” (Empire Lite 2003a, 19)

What about the rectitude of the intention? That rectitude entails two elements: acceptance of the goal and honest and clear articulation of that goal. If one has a fundamental objection to imperial stretch, so that if the real motive of the Iraq war was the imperial expansion of American power and economic domination in the region, even if it is not intended to settle colonies in the region but was an enlightened empire intent on fostering self-determination and democracy, then the Iraq war would always be viewed as wrong. But if one honestly and sincerely believes that extending American power and the global economy are virtues in securing a new world made safe through the expansion of democracy, then this is an eminently defensible intention for Ignatieff. The real failure was the inability to articulate clearly such a goal as both legitimate and valid.

What about the reasonable prospect of success and the adoption of means proportional to the end task? These, for Ignatieff, are reciprocal conditions. As Ignatieff wrote, the second Iraq War took half the troops, half the time and half the monies compared to the first Gulf War. But the long-term costs will be much greater, especially if America fails to get the costs shared. (New York Times Magazine 2003c) This is especially true since “the more spread out and diffused American military power becomes the more vulnerable each unit is to capture, ambush or hostage-taking.” (Empire Lite 2003a, 5) The principle problem is to ensure the means are proportional to meet the ends in the sense that they are sufficient to meet that end. They cannot be insufficient. They cannot be too diffused. “Empires that do not understand the limits of their own capabilities do not survive. Empires that cannot balance pride with prudence do not endure. An endless war on terror tempts the empire to overstretch, and when it overstretches, it becomes vulnerable.” (Empire Lite 2003a, 6)

Are there limits to the targets in balancing means to the ends of the intervention? Clearly! Though America intervened to stop the Greek and North Korean communists, the dominant doctrine of intervention had its limits. For Michael, intervention that risked conflict – perhaps nuclear conflict -- with a great power was not worth the candle. Thus, a doctrine of intervention must be governed by boundary conditions. Intervention that entails great risk is to be avoided and therefore entails, never picking on someone your own size. But it also involves never fighting someone who is more willing to die than you are. However, the very context of the conflict – preceded by 9/11 and Afghanistan and the very fact of the ‘Great Satan’ invading an Arab state – invites religious fanatics more willing to die than Americans to join the battle. This should have been expected. That is why America had to deploy sufficient forces after the initial battles to show these fanatics that their martyrdom was ineffective. The willingness to die among Americans had to be supplemented by enhanced forces and a dispersion of that lesser will on one side and a demonstration that the fanaticism on the other side would be a wasted effort. Then the scales could be balanced the other way.

That is why a risk-averse strategy dooms any imperial ambition. The doctrine of avoiding American casualties (a unique made-at-home American doctrine) is, for Ignatieff and many others, a self defeating one since this principle made force protection as important an objective as mission accomplishment and sends the wrong signal to the enemy, i.e, that Americans would cut and run when they suffered casualties, as America did in Lebanon and Somalia, and as Belgium did in Rwanda after losing only a dozen men. (New York Times Magazine 2003c) And because of the need following the war rather than those required to fight the war, the doctrine requires an update of the Powell dictum (never to intervene except with overwhelming force in defense of a vital national interest) to apply to ensuring security following the decimation of the enemy in the opening battle. Further, Ignatieff adopts the older just war dictum never to use force except as a last resort by amending it to read that one must actually plan to use force as a last resort in order to decrease the chance that it will have to be used. The credibility that force will be used decreases the possibility that it will have to be used. The lack of credibility that one intends to use force enhances the prospect that, in the end, your side will have to resort to its use. Just because the Americans used pre-emption in Afghanistan and Iraq, it was important than they made clear, clearer than they did certainly, that they were ready to have diplomacy resolve the crisis, but the crisis had to be resolved otherwise force was being readied to be employed, not just as an empty threat, but as an imperative to back the threat behind an effective strategy of preventive diplomacy.  When force is used as a last resort, given the Realist Critique: - the limits of American capacity to determine outcomes – in governing the conduct of war itself - jus in bello – where the principle of proportionality applies to the quantity of force that is ethically appropriate to achieve the objectives, then the real issue is to ensure that the military employed in theatre do realize the objectives – all the objectives. 

Given the ethnic and religious differences and the difficulty of creating a unified governing structure in the face of such basic divisions, with the probability that one group would have hegemony over the others, given the regional forces at play – principally Turkey against an autonomous Kurdish north and Iran trying to enlist the Shi’ites in its politics of religion thus setting up the prospect of a renewed arms race in the region – given the probability that the democratic deficit will continue for some time and will be sacrificed for stability, given the economic doctrine of open markets in the face of the need for protection to develop local economic businesses for a recovering economy, especially to tie in with a globalized economy, the imperative of ensuring the state preserves a monopoly on violence through all these contingencies and risks becomes all important. 

The issue, then, is not so much the occupation as the perception of that occupation. If the populace ends up demonizing the United States, seeds are planted for strengthened long-term enmity while undermining the prospects of giving legitimacy to any government unless that government too begins to criticize the USA. How then is this accomplished in terms of an adequate and proportionate deployment of forces? One path entails reconstituting the Iraq army by building a three-division army and a Civil Defense Corps by the summer of 2004 and implementing the plan to double the size of the police force by the summer of 2005. The alternative of following the Japanese precedent where intervention worked reasonably well by denying Japan the right to rebuild its army may not apply given the plethora of internal and external forces threaten to undermine the enterprise even if the development of a military supported and trained by the USA risks setting off a regional arms race.

What is not part of the visible horizon in the near future for Ignatieff is any short-term prospect of building a viable justice system in order to rein in criminal and revenge-seeking activity, since that is a very long-term endeavour. More significantly, given the lack of any preceding democratic institutions on which to build, given the questioning of the legitimacy of the existing government, given the necessary conditions for building democratic institutions, given the distrust of American motives, given the mode of reforming the economy in a way that will not damage the interests of small holders, given that democratic state building is a long term task likely to be subordinated to building a viable and, even possibly, legitimate state, the timetable and priorities for rebuilding both a democratic government and a viable economy seem at odds, and democracy will be subordinated to economic recovery. That means that belief that the only path to full Iraqi sovereignty is through a written constitution, ratified and followed by free, democratic elections, may have to be postponed for more mundane but more obvious modes of involving the Iraqis in their own governance.

That means that it will be even more important to ensure that civilians are not only not targeted, but are “collateral damage” in as few instances as possible.

“Warrior’s honor implied an idea of war as a moral theater in which one displayed one’s manly virtues in public…Warrior’s honor was both a code of belonging and an ethic of responsibility. Wherever the art of war was practiced, warriors distinguished between combatants and noncombatants, legitimate and illegitimate targets, moral and immoral weaponry, civilized and barbarous usage in the treatment of prisoners and of the wounded. Such codes may have been honored as often in the breach as in the observance, but without them war is not war – it is no more than slaughter.” (Warrior’s Honor 1997b, 117) 





Iraq, for Ignatieff, is destined to be “the place where its fight against Islamic jihad will be won or lost. (NYT Magazine 2003c If the United States fails there, so will the United Nations. What is more, when America intervened for predominantly moral reasons as well as economic interests and its quest for power, as in Europe in 1917 and 1941, “American soldiers helped save Europe from dictatorship, and their hard fighting turned America into the most powerful nation on earth.” In other words, combine morality and self-interest and you do both a good deed and enhance your power. (NYT Magazine 2003c)

Intervention even for imperial goals, as long as the means and conditions are governed by moral considerations and the goal has at least a patina of morality in its objectives, is a virtuous enterprise because it has the following results:
1.	getting rid of a totalitarian regime that terrorized its own population;
2.	providing security for the Shiites;
3.	revealing to Iraqis how bad Saddam Hussein was;
4. the provision, if successful, of a precedent for defeating anti-rights regimes elsewhere.

	But does the whole enterprise no risk unloosing the demons of ethno-nationalism?

J.	The Specter of Nationalism

For Ignatieff, “The key narrative of the new world order is a new age of violence. The key narrative of the new world order is the disintegration of nation-states into ethnic civil war; the key architects of that order are warlords; and the key language of our age is ethnic nationalism.” (Blood and Belonging 1993a, 5) There we have it - not global terrorists but the need for a new world order to offset the demise of the nation-state and the accompanying violence brought on by ethnic nationalism, ethnic civil war and the rise of warlords as political players. For Ignatieff, “nationalism is the belief that the world’s peoples are divided into nations, and that each of these nations has the right to self-determination, either as self-governing units within existing nation-states or as nation-states on their own. As a cultural ideal, nationalism is the claim that while men and women have many identities, it is the nation that provides them with their primary form of belonging. As a moral ideal, nationalism is an ethic of heroic sacrifice, justifying the use of violence in the defense of one’s nation against enemies, internal or external. The claims – political, moral and cultural – underwrite each other. The moral claim that nations are entitled to be defended by force or violence depends on the cultural claim that the needs they satisfy for security and belonging are uniquely important. The political idea that all peoples should struggle for nationhood depends on the cultural claim that only nations can satisfy those needs. The cultural idea in turn underwrites the political claim that these needs cannot be satisfied without self-determination.” (Blood and Belonging 1993a, 5)

Michael Ignatieff joins with many others as a strong critic of nationalism, but not nationalism per se. Just ethno-nationalism. Civic nationalism is fine. This is how he ended his 1993 book Blood and Belonging. “What’s wrong with the world is not nationalism itself. Every people must have a home, every hunger must be assuaged. What’s wrong is the kind of nation, the kind of home that nationalists want to create and the means they use to seek their ends. Whenever I went, I found a struggle going on between those who still believe that a nation should be home to all, and race, color, religion, and creed should be no bar to belonging, and those who want their nation only to be home to their own. It’s the battle between the civic and the ethnic nation. I know which side I’m on. I also know which side, right now, happens to be winning.” (Blood and Belonging 1993a, 249) As he said near the beginning of the book, “All forms of nationalism vest political sovereignty in ‘the people’…One type, civic nationalism, maintains that the nations should be composed of all those – regardless of race, color, creed, gender, language, or ethnicity – who subscribe to the nation’s political creed. This nationalism is called civic because it envisages the nation as a community of equal, rights-bearing citizens, united in patriotic attachment to a shared set of political practices and values. This nationalism is necessarily democratic since it vests sovereignty in all of the people…{However,} The German Romantics argued that it was not the state that created the nation, as the Enlightenment believed, but the nation, its people, that created the state. What gave unity to the nation, what made it a home, a place of passionate attachment, was not the cold contrivance of shared rights but the people’s preexisting ethnic characteristics: their language, religion, customs, and traditions. The nation as Volk had begun its long and troubling career in European thought…Of these two types of nationalism, the civic has a greater claim to sociological realism.” (Blood and Belonging 1993a, 6-7) 

Why is civic nationalism good and ethnic nationalism bad? Because civic nationalism is multi-ethnic! What holds a state together built on civic nationalism is the rule of law, rather than common roots; the rule of law provides a rational rather than an emotional attachment and a chosen rather than an inherited attachment. The emotion behind ethnic nationalism is sentiment as well as fear and trust: “The latent purpose of such sentimentality is to imply that one is in the grip of a love greater than reason, stronger than the will, a love akin to fate and destiny. Such a love assists the belief that it is fate, however tragic, that obliges you to kill.” (Blood and Belonging 1993a, 10) Thus, “The only reliable antidote to ethnic nationalism turns out to be civic nationalism, because the only guarantee that ethnic groups will live side by side in peace is shared loyalty to a state strong enough, fair enough, equitable enough to command their obedience.” (Blood and Belonging 1993a, 243)

Thus, ethnic nationalism and civic nationalism are not just two distinct categories. Civic nationalism is the antidote to ethno-nationalism. Further, ethno-nationalism is antagonistic to civic nationalism. “Being only yourself is what ethnic nationalism will not allow. When people come. By terror or exaltation, to think of themselves as patriots first, individuals second, they have embarked on a path of ethical abdication.” (Blood and Belonging 1993a, 248)

What are the roots of ethno-nationalism? At one point he says: “Ethnic nationalism was the invention of the German Romantic intelligentsia during the period of the Napoleonic invasions of the German princedoms.” (Blood and Belonging 1993a, 85) In this view, “Nationalism is the doctrine which holds (1) that the world’s peoples are divided into nations, (2) that these nations should have the right to self-determination, and (3) that full self-determination requires statehood.” (1993, p. 145) Ignatieff traces the roots of ethno-nationalism to the romantics for “the Romantics bequeathed the tyranny of identity politics; the obsessional elaboration of an identity distinguishably one’s own, safe from contamination or impingement by other races, religions, genders or nationalities…Self-creation might be an innocuous, occasionally noble, in conditions of freedom, but in the hands of a Napoleon or a Hitler, it could degenerate into a justification for moulding human clay into instruments of their own diabolical will.” (Blood and Belonging 1993a, 247)

However, at another point he writes: “In reality, the British are among the most fiercely nationalistic of all peoples. Indeed modern nationalism is an English invention …From the very outset of its nationhood, Englishness was destined antagonistically as the creed of an Anglo-Saxon Protestant nation locked in battle with continental Europe, the Papacy, and the Catholic Irish. From the Marian persecutions of the 1550s through the Spanish Armada of 1588, to the execution of Charles I in the Civil War, the English nation defined itself against Catholic invaders from abroad and Catholic despots at home.” (Blood and Belonging 1993a, 221-2) So he will write about Protestant Northerners that: “I’ve never come across a form of nationalism so intensely ritualized.” (Blood and Belonging 1993a, 241)

At still another point he describes a third type of nationalism that is certainly not an intellectual invention of Romantic thinkers or an expression of religious Protestantism opposed to the Papacy and Catholic cosmopolitanism. Its roots are even deeper and they seem to be identified with the reverence for the dead. “Kiev is the fountain of all Russian Orthodoxy, for it was the Kievan Prince Vladimir who in 987 married the daughter of the Byzantine emperor in Constantinople and at the same time converted, along with all his subjects, to Christianity…For Ukrainians, the monastery consecrates the site of the beginning of Ukrainian national consciousness; for Russians, Kievan Rus is the beginning of the Russian national experience. The ‘loss’ of Ukraine is thus, from Russia’s point of view, the loss not merely of a province but of its own symbolic beginnings.” (Blood and Belonging 1993a, 116) As he went on to say, “Something about this cult of the dead, this loving preservation of bodies that ought to have turned to dust, this association between faith and death, makes me nauseous. Two nations, two languages, two histories originate in this dark maze underneath the monastery.” 

But as I documented above, he also wrote that ethno-nationalism always emerges when the political forces that allowed different ethnic groups to live side by side in tolerance and respect was removed, the resultant insecurity forced the people back into relying on blood identity in their ethnicity for safety and security.​[30]​ Ethno-nationalism is thus a product of reversion to a Hobbesian state of nature. There is a causative order: “first the collapse of the overarching state, then Hobbesian fear, and only then nationalist paranoia, followed by warfare. Disintegration of the state comes first; nationalist paranoia comes next. Nationalist sentiment on the ground, among common people, is a secondary consequence of political disintegration, a response to the collapse of state order and the interethnic accommodation that it made possible. Nationalism creates a community of fear, groups held together by the conviction that their security depends on sticking together.” (Warrior’s Honor 1997b, 45)

Ignatieff appears to be quite contradictory on whether ethno-nationalism is an intellectual invention of German romantic thinkers, or an invention of the English people or nation itself rooted in Protestantism in conflict with the cosmopolitan Catholic Church, or whether it is a cult of the dead intricately interwoven with an attachment to the places where one buries one’s ancestors, or whether it is an ahistorical by-product that arises in the absence of a Leviathan state that can provide security. But perhaps he is writing about four sub-types of ethno-nationalism. 

This would appear to be the case when he describes German nationalism. German nationalism is not a regional response to a hegemonic power with cosmopolitan pretensions as in the rivalry between the Protestantism of Holland and England opposed to the foreign other - the cosmopolitan papacy. Nor does it seem to be a product of fear and insecurity when state power recedes and the individual citizens or subjects are cast into a ‘state of nature’, and everyone falls into a fear of the proximate other. “The problem Herr K. is not that he is a nationalist but that he is a German nationalist who actually despises the Germany he lives in. He wants a Germany for the Germans, when there are already 6 million foreigners here. He wants a Germany that is law-abiding, clean, orderly, where women stay at home, where the television does not preach sex and violence to its adolescents.” (Blood and Belonging 1993a, 98) This seems to have nothing to do with a protest against the papacy or an attachment to the graves of one’s ancestors and certainly not to a fear founded in the loss of security by the state. Rather, it is a sense of nationalism built on care and concern for a set of common values rooted in one’s ideas and the use of language. “But belonging also means being recognized and being understood…This is why…the protection and defense of a nation’s language is such a deeply emotional nationalist cause, for it is language, more than land and history, that provides the essential form of belonging, which is to be understood.” (1993, p. 10) It is exclusivist without denying the separate identity of the other.

In contrast, English or British nationalism is not an intellectual inheritance or invention; nor does it have anything to do with romantic thought. It is a product of history. This is true both as a prospective nationalism and a retrospective one. Writing about Northern Ireland, Ignatieff characterizes the Loyalist nationalism he observed there as “specifically British, above all in its imperial memory of being masters once, and thus in its inability to conceive, let alone accept, becoming a minority in someone else’s nation. It is also specifically British in its injured assertion of rights denied and betrayed, and in its inability to translate the sense of democratic injury into a genuinely democratic nationalism. This is true of mainland British nationalism as well. British national consciousness as a whole continues to see the nation embodied, not in the people, but in the Crown. The British think of themselves as subjects, not as citizens, and popular commitment to the civic achievements of British history – the rule of law, the sovereignty of Parliament, the stability of the state – tends to express itself in an infantilized idealization of the monarchy.” (Blood and Belonging 1993a, 242)

If German nationalism is connected to a romantic sense of language and a Volk, it does not mean it is uniformitarian.​[31]​ Quite the reverse! It is a doctrine of pluralism.  In contrast, although British nationalism is connected with history and with loyalty to institutions, originally the Crown, the loyalty gradually transferred to parliament and the rule of law in which the loyalty to the crown remained as the maraschino cherry atop the sentimental whipped cream. Eventually the universal creed of civic nationalism emerged from those roots as it did in France through a different path.
If German nationalism is tied primarily to language and a worship of the Volk quite independently of the fluctuating borders of the nation, if British nationalism is tied to history and inherited institutions, Russian nationalism is tied to land and graves. “Nations and graves. Graves and nations. Land is sacred because it is where your ancestors lie. Ancestors must be remembered because human life is a small and trivial thing without the anchoring of the past. Land is worth dying for, because strangers will profane the graves…Looking back, I see that time in the crypt as a moment when I began to change, when some element of respect for the national project began to creep into my feelings, when I understood why land and graves matter and why the nations matter that protect both.” (Blood and Belonging 1993a, 124-5) As he wrote later in the book, “at its most elemental, nationalism is perhaps the desire to have political dominion over a piece of land that one loves. Before anything, there must be a fierce attachment to the land itself and a sense that there is nothing like this, nothing so beautiful, anywhere else in the world.” (Blood and Belonging 1993a, 196)​[32]​ As he described the Crimean Tatars​[33]​ who had their own sense of a nationalism of land and graves: “’This is a sacred place for us. My grandfather, my father, were born here and died here. If I had not pushed my children to return, who would have done it? We would have lost our nation, our culture.’” (Blood and Belonging 1993a, 135) “I have never encountered anything like this, a people for whom land has such a sacramental importance. In their discipline and digging and fierceness they are like Israeli pioneers in the 1930s or the 1940s What is self-evident to them is the connection between nationhood – narod – and personal; dignity Without nationhood, people sneer at you on the bus; people jeer at you for what you are. It is not enough to be a people. In order to have respect, you must have a nation.” (Blood and Belonging 1993a 136)​[34]​ Thus, “nationalism seeks to hallow death, to redeem individual loss and link it to destiny and fate. A lonely frightened boy with a gun who dies at a crossroads in a firefight ceases to be just a lonely frightened boy. In the redeeming language of nationalism, he joins the imagined community of the Martyrs.” (Blood and Belonging 1993a, 16)

So is ethno-nationalism, the fourth type, but an echo of the historically earliest and on its appearance, most basic and primitive nationalism, the nationalism of land and graves? Possibly. But the ethno-nationalism he so vividly describes in the nineties is about insecurity, about blood and race and not just about tending the graves of one’s ancestors. In fact, the ethno-nationalism will often take tremendous risks about the land and the graves in order to unite Serb with Serb and Croat with Croat who are in different locales. Ethno-nationalism seems to be the only doctrine of blood and belonging of the four, one rooted in insecurity. “Nationalist rhetoric swept through these regions like wildfire because it provided warlords and gunmen with a vocabulary of opportunistic self-justification. In the fear and panic which swept the ruins of the Communist states, people began to ask: So who will protect me now? Faced with a situation of political and economic chaos, people wanted to know whom to trust, and whom to call their own. Ethnic nationalism provided an answer that was intuitively obvious: Only trust those of your own blood.” (Blood and Belonging 1993a, 9) 

This is a nationalism much more primitive that that of Russian nationalism for it is not so much rooted in the duty of protection as in violence almost for its own sake. It is not rooted in the unwritten laws of tradition, akin to a natural law like gravity that is a constant, but is a construct opportunistically used by warlords and reinvented to serve the moment.​[35]​ Further, it is not defined in identification with an Other, but in contradistinction to an Other. “Everywhere I’ve been, nationalism is most violent where the group you are defining yourself against most closely resembles you.…the very similarity is what pushes them to define themselves as polar opposites. Since Cain and Abel, we have known that hatred between brothers is more ferocious than hatred between strangers.” (Blood and Belonging 1993a, 255)​[36]​ It is indeed the nationalism of narcissism and minor differences in appearance. It is not the nationalism of loyalty of a child to the burial places of his or her forefathers, or a sister to ensure her dead warrior brother is buried as in the drive behind Antigone’s efforts to bury her brother Polyneices left by Creon on the battlefield to rot as a condemned traitor. In Russian nationalism of the land, the identification is with the community in which one lives and not in an ethnic group or ‘ethno-nation’. Unlike the ethno-nationalism of the nineties, an ethno-nationalism in which leaders use religion as a prop without a scent of spirituality, the Russian nationalism of the land and the grave is rooted in the religious ceremonies common to but characteristic of a community. It is a nationalism of congregational celebration of tradition and not of wanton misuse and destruction of that tradition. “I understand what nationalism really is: the dream that a whole nation could be like a congregation; singing the same hymns, listening to the same gospel, sharing the same emotions, linked not only to each other but to the dead buried beneath their feet.” (Blood and Belonging 1993a, 127)​[37]​

Let me differentiate the Russian nationalism of land and graves, with which Ignatieff felt a mixture of identity and repulsion, from the ethno-nationalism of ethnic cleansing and extermination of the Other. The latter is indeed rooted in a worship of blood – hemo in Greek. It is a nationalism of passion and fire as in the old Greek myth that identified a warrior as influenced by the temperature of the menses, the menstrual blood in the womb. The more heat, the greater identity and the propensity to multiple births in the same womb, whereas when children do not look like their parents, it is because of the absence of heat and the belief that the blood was allowed to grow cold. In contrast, Russian nationalism is not a by-product of blood and belonging but of thumos, of spirit that mediates between the rational soul and the passions. It is associated with courage of the warrior that is cultivated and disciplined and is not the rashness of murderers associated with the slaughter of civilians by ethno-nationalist barbarians. It is about harming enemies, not innocents, and about loyalty to friends, whereas, as Ignatieff observed, Milosevic was always ready to abandon the Serbs of Krajina and Eastern Slavonia as well as the Serbs of Bosnia in Republica Srpska. Spirit mediates between the invisible realm of the intellect and mind and the needs of the body and its passions, and is not driven by its passions using the intellect merely as a tool that in the name of reconstruction engages in wanton destruction. As we all can recall, in Plato’s Republic, in society, the guardians or warrior class, phulakes, play the analogous role to the thumos in the body. Justice has to do with "guarding" not destruction, with rendering to each his due,​[38]​ evil and death only to enemies and protection to friends and the innocent. It requires self-sacrifice, not the sacrifice of the Other. Even the duty of a warrior to kill the enemy inflicts death on the body of the Other, but scars the soul of the warrior. 

So we must differentiate these four very different types of nationalism: the nationalism of land and graves of the Russians rooted in religion and the ethos and honor of a warrior class of guardians entrusted with the protection of the community and innocents; the nationalism of the British that will evolve into what Michael calls civic nationalism as its abstract ahistorical derivative, a nationalism tied to allegiance to institutions and their historical evolution; the nationalism of the German romantics rooted in ideas and language to which the Nazis paid lip service in their racist and ethno-nationalism of blood and belonging but with which it has very little in common. The latter is an exercise in revolutionary human engineering of the future and not a respect for the spirit of a people. Ignatieff was totally correct in observing that, “Nationalism [here he means ethno-nationalism] does not simply ‘express’ a preexistent identity; it ‘constitutes’ a new one.” (Warrior’s Honor 1997b, 38) It aims to elevate the people by de-selection rather than to protect their values and traditions. Instead of respecting language, language becomes the tool of propagandists and phrase-mongers. Thus, “For him {Milosevic], nationalist demagoguery was a language game, a rhetorical strategy for electoral survival in the uncertain world of the post-Titoist succession battle” (Warrior’s Honor 1997b, 42) in which he used a volatile mix of genuine grievance and self-pitying paranoia. 

If the nationalism of land and graves is about a sister’s loyalty to her brother, ethno-nationalism “exists to warrant and legitimize the son’s vengeance against the father…The rational core of such fear is that there is a deep connection between violence and belonging. The more strongly you feel the bonds of belonging to your own group, the more hostile, the more violent will your feelings be toward outsiders. You can’t have the intensity of belonging without violence, because belonging of this intensity molds the individual conscience: if a nation gives people a reason to sacrifice themselves, it also gives them a reason to kill.” (Blood and Belonging 1993a, 247)

Ignatieff, though simplistically distinguishing between civic and ethnic nationalism, tends to use nationalism as equivalent to ethnic nationalism alone: “If nationalism legitimizes an appeal to blood loyalty and, in turn, blood sacrifice, it can do so persuasively only if it seems to appeal to people’s better natures, and not just to their worst instincts…If violence is to be legitimated, it must be in the name of all that is best in people, and what is better than their love of home?” (Blood and Belonging 1993a, 9) Here he confuses the superficial utility of the essential features of the other types of nationalism with the essential character of ethno-nationalism. He does it with loyalty to language as well as to land, for ethno-nationalists have no loyalty other than the loyalty of mobsters to one another and the cult of blood brothers. 

Why does civil war erupt: “the imperial police have departed”. (Blood and Belonging 1993a, 12) Ethno-nationalism is a by-product of the absence of institutions of authority and power and ends “up imprisoning everyone in the Balkans in the fiction of “pure” ethnic identity.” (Blood and Belonging 1993a, 25) “[O]nce the multi-ethnic state disintegrated, every national group outside it’s republic’s borders suddenly found itself an endangered national minority. As the largest such group, the Serbs felt particularly vulnerable to the rise of Croation nationalism.” (Blood and Belonging 1993a, 26) And each of the ethnic groups adopted the idea of self-determination.​[39]​ 

While the nationalism of land, graves and tradition, the nationalism of loyalty to institutions and history, and the Romantic nationalism of ideas, the intelligence of the heart and of language, are all nationalisms of responsibility, ethno-nationalism is all about the abrogation of responsibility. “It was in Vukovar that I began to see how nationalism works as a moral vocabulary of self-exoneration. No one is responsible for anything but the other side. In the mortal universe of pure nationalist delusion, all action is compelled by tragic necessity. Towns must be destroyed in order to liberate them. Hostages must be shot. Massacres must be undertaken. Why? Because the other side started it first. Because the other side are beasts and understand no language but violence and reprisal. And so on. Everyone in a nationalist war speaks in the language of fate, compulsion and moral abdication.” (Blood and Belonging 1993a, 45) 





What has this long digression into the contradictions underpinning Michael Ignatieff’s thesis on nationalism have to do with his thesis on intervention? It has a twofold purpose. First, one of Ignatieff’s horror scenarios in Iraq is a disintegration of the state into a violent conflict between Kurds, Sunni and Shiite. Second, his analysis points to the Hobbesian roots of his doctrine and his belief that any Leviathan, even an imperial one, especially if it is a benevolent non-colonizing one determined to facilitate self-determination, is better than the potential regression into a state of nature and a war of all against all, even if it is really just a war between a few finite ethnic groups. We will have to probe these contradictions in categorization based on a presumed fundamental premise about human nature and the roots of the polity in another chapter after we have explored the details of the case studies. For now, however, we can conclude by bringing together some of the contradictions that emerge for this doctrine of intervention.

Michael Ignatieff tries to combine a number of elements – enhancing economic self-interest and securing imperial power with a moral purpose of building democracy and empowering the people in the state in which the intervention takes place. Though he calls for integrating morality with the pursuit of interests and power, they are brought together in a forced marriage, for the Hobbesian premises do not allow for any integration. Morality always remains a patina and a camouflage. No wonder it is always suspect! 

In the military area, Iganatieff wants a much larger and more effective force, not to win the opening battle, but to secure the peace by ensuring that only the state retains a monopoly on the use of force. But how do you have a large army of occupation while fostering self-government? How will such a force impact on the need to respect, indeed celebrate, the richness and depth of the local culture? And as long as you believe that order comes out of the muzzle of a gun in the monopoly of violence, then any resistance to that order is itself justified in resorting to arms to “fight the oppressor and occupier”. Even more importantly, if the requisite large occupying force must remain in situ for a very long time, and a government is only legitimate if it maintains a monopoly on the use of violence, how can any local government, even following elections, retain any legitimacy if it is necessarily propped up by foreign occupying forces. Resistance is inevitable, and how can the intervening state stay the course, discriminate between civilians and militant resisters as targets, and satisfy the domestic fears of a wealthy society unwilling to sacrifice its sons and daughter in foreign wars for murky moral objectives as the fickle media increasingly report on the effects of a scattered group of guerillas and the body bags being transported back home? If, according to Ignatieff, the television medium in particular feeds despair and misanthropy, how can the civil society of the intervening states satisfy its need to be inspired by hope?

Thus, in addition to the abyss between the power and self-interest goals and the moral aims, there is a chasm between these goals and the means available to achieve them, not in winning the military battles but in securing the peace. According to Michael’s own analysis, the greatest risk is of violent conflict among Shia, Sunni, and Kurds, which may have already been started in the militant action targeting foreign occupiers, whether military or humanitarian, and their alleged local collaborators. Recall a quote from Michael included earlier, and a destiny he thought was inevitable. “[A]fter seeing Halabja, you realize one thing very clearly: autonomy will never do. It is a stopping point along the way to destination. But it can never be the end of the road. For Halabja happened, and for a people who have known genocide, there is only one thing that will do: a nation-state of their own.” (Blood and Belonging 1993a, 199) According to this observation, secession is unstoppable. It is the rhetorical support for maintaining the integrity of Iraq that will become more and more a virtual scenario rather than a reality.  As and if the security situation spirals downwards, self-determination will be sacrificed either for the quest for hegemony by one ethnic group or the disintegration of the state into three separate entities. 

In Ignatieff’s Hobbes/Locke sequential scenario for building the foundations of a viable state, one possible scenario for fostering unity and preventing internecine warfare can be found in engaging in an external war, an external war that cannot be confined since the new state involved will have its own domestic tensions, whether that state is Syria, Iran or even Turkey. Based on Ignatieff’s premises for intervention, the integrity of the state can only be maintained by ensuring permanent war, just as Leon Trotsky once advocated permanent revolution not only to globalize the class conflict but to undermine the potential for dictatorship of the ruling elite. In this case, intervention is merely foreplay before a new global war. 

According to Michael Ignatieff, given the initial failures to establish a hegemony and monopoly on violence and prevent the subsequent after-effects, given the boomerang effect of these after-effects on the domestic polity, military reinforcement becomes less and less likely as it becomes more and more necessary. Into this vacuum of fear and distrust, Kurds, Shiite and Sunni will increasingly trust the central government less and resort to the use of force even more, thus further undermining the possibility of a democratic multi-ethnic state in Iraq. This, in turn, will lesson the willingness of the United States to remain for the long haul, especially since, in the end, the whole moral justification for the intervention will have receded to an infinitely small point of the horizon of possibilities. There is little reason, given the current rationale, for the Americans and their allies to sacrifice its forces if either secession or hegemonic rule by one ethnic group is the likely outcome, especially if the former risks a war with Turkey and the latter involves Iran in support of the Shiites. If the democratic deficit continues for some time in the quest for stability, if the instability further undermines the possibility of economic recovery, and given the bleak alternatives, occupation will only be sustained by enhancing the domestic deficit at home and turning America more and more into a military imperium. 

It is very ironic that Michael Ignatieff who eschews historical inevitability and fatalism should have constructed a theory and the scenarios that follow from it that result in either one of four possibilities given Ignatieff’s own observations of the forces at work and the actualities on the ground. They are either disintegration of the state of Iraq, an expanded war, a new hegemony of one group over another, or the expansion of American power at the sacrifice of its domestic democracy. Not included in that visible forecast in any scenario is a state governed by the rule of law and the reining in of increased criminal behavior, quite separate from the resistance of militants. 
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^6	  “Recognition, restorative justice and retribution,” Siri Gloppen and Elin Skaar, eds. Roads to Reconciliation, publication pending.
^7	  Michael Ignatieff wrote a television play, Dialogue in the Dark that was directed by Jonathan Miller for BBC Television in 1989 and dealt with David Hume on his death bed debating the issue of the afterlife with James Boswell, a topic he had already discussed in his 1984 book, The Needs of Strangers (1984). It is clear that Michael’s sympathies are with Hume.
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^9	  Howard Adelman (1974) "Rational Explanation Reconsidered: Case Studies on the Hempel‑Dray Model," History and Theory, XIII, 3, 208‑224.
^10	  This attitude was adopted in spite of the Ukraine being a state with 52 million people in a territory the size of France, the sixth largest naval power (though on p. 130 he describes the Black Sea fleet as “the twelfth largest naval force in the world”) with an army of 600,000 and the third largest nuclear army in the world  [Blood and Belonging 1993a, 106] and it was the discrepancy between this reality and his own propensity to belittle Ukrainians that stimulated his efforts at critical self-reflection. 
^11	  Howard Adelman (2002) "Repatriation of Refugees Following the Signing of Peace Agreements: A Comparative Study of the Aftermath of Peace in Fourteen Civil Wars” in Stephen Stedman et al Thematic Issues in Peace Agreements Following Civil Wars. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
^12	  Geneva Accord (Beilin-Abd-Rabbo Document) Preliminary Text, October 2003, Draft Final Status Agreement.
^13	  Robert Skidelsky, the famous biographer of John Maynard Keynes, also wrote frequently for the NYRB, was a personal friend of Michael Ignatieff’s and together with John Grieve, Mike O’Brien, and David G. Green (2000) had written, Institutional Racism and the Police: Fact or Fiction? (Civil Society) Civitas: Institute for the Study of Civil Society.
^14	  Over time, Ignatieff has presented variations on these points and different numbers. For example in Human Rights (2001c), he provided four criteria: “Three criteria have emerged in the late 1990s for the rationing of interventions: (1) the human rights abuses at issue have to be gross, systematic, and pervasive; (2) they have to be a threat to international peace and security in the surrounding region; and (3) military intervention has to stand a real chance of putting a stop to the abuses. In practice, a fourth criterion comes into play: the region in question must be of vital interest, for cultural, strategic, or geopolitical reasons, to one of the powerful nations in the word and another powerful nation does not oppose the exercise of force.” (p. 40)
^15	  However, Ignatieff believed all along that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction. In fact, at times, he seemed more hawkish than Bush on the subject. In a review essay of Khidhir Hamza’s book, Saddam's Bombmaker: The Terrifying Inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons Agenda (NYRB, 48: 5, March 29, 2001) called “Bush’s First Strike, he wrote: “Since Iraq's nuclear weapons program is more than twenty years old and UN inspectors have long since found credible evidence of a developed "chemical and biological capability," it's not clear why the President keeps pretending that Saddam does not already possess weapons of mass destruction. Weeks before the February 16 strikes, reports appeared in the British press, based on information supplied by Iraqi defectors, that Saddam has two operational atomic bombs in his arsenal. The administration neither confirms nor denies these reports in public, but in recent testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee, CIA director George Tenet conceded that since the Desert Fox air strikes of 1998, Iraq had rebuilt "key portions" of its chemical weapons capability. If the CIA is correct, the President is misleading the public: Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction are not just something Bush may "catch them developing." Some, at least, are already in his arsenal: deadly nerve agents like VX and sarin, biological agents like anthrax and botulin, together with the missiles to deliver them against its neighbors, especially Israel and Iran... With the collapse of the Middle East peace talks, Saddam is using surging oil revenues to buy the nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons that will put him in the forefront of the Arab rejectionists who want to drive America from the region and throw Israel into the sea.” Further on in the article, Ignatieff demonstrated he was clearly more hawkish than Bush. “If containment means weakening his military and economic infrastructure, bombing and sanctions have done that. But it's not clear that we can justify permanently weakening Iraq. If containment means checking Saddam's influence among the Arab masses, it has failed. If containment means preventing Saddam from harming the Kurds in the north and the Shiites in the south—this is the ostensible purpose of the no-fly zones—the flights have provided some protection for the Kurds but they did not prevent Saddam from marching into Irbil in 1996, and the flights have not prevented him from inflicting terrible repression against the Shiites. And if containment means stopping him from making weapons of mass destruction, the evidence, at least from the President's remarks, is that the policy actually consists of pretending that they don't yet constitute a threat. As long as he can pretend that weapons of mass destruction aren't yet a threat, the President doesn't need to do anything about them.” 
^16	  “When UN weapons inspectors were trying to assess his concealed capacity, the most valuable information came from invoices from his American and European suppliers. For example, by discovering how much biological growth material—approximately forty tons—that Saddam had purchased from foreign pharmaceutical firms, the weapons inspectors were able to deduce the approximate size of the biological weapons program—using anthrax, botulin, camel pox, gangrene, and brucella—that he was concealing. The collusion of European and American pharmaceutical companies, precision equipment manufacturers, and weapons suppliers in the development of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction is the great scandal of the story of Saddam's rearming. The willingness of foreign scientists, hungry for money, to aid the development of weapons of mass destruction is genuinely astonishing.” Op. cit. As a result, Ignatieff was one of the few commentators from the liberal side to give the appearance of sympathizing with the possibility of a program of “regime change” replacing a containment strategy. “The hard truth is that the credible options—‘smart’ targeted sanctions, aerial surveillance, no-fly zones to protect at least the Kurds if not the Shiites, and bombing as a last resort—do not add up to a very effective strategy of containment. Whatever we do, we do not seem close to eliminating Saddam's weapons of mass destruction. This leads many Republican hawks and some Democrats to support a move from containment to "regime change." (Op. cit.) However, the conclusion of his article showed that he merely wanted a containment and deterrence policy with teeth and did not support regime change. “The purpose of American policy should not be to overthrow Saddam: that is for his own people to do, and American attempts to do so may well only strengthen him. Nor is it wise or just to attempt to keep Iraq poor and miserable. American purposes should be confined to protecting Kurdish autonomy in the north of the country, and preventing Iraq from harming, destabilizing, or overthrowing its neighbors, or endangering the flow of oil. This limited set of goals should be attainable with credible threats and the determination to use targeted and discriminate measures. There now seems no plausible alternative to a long struggle of wills with Saddam Hussein, in which the great mistake for the US would be to yield to the temptation to cut that struggle short,” even though, as Ignatieff wrote in an earlier review essay, “air power cannot change enemy regimes: it can only damage their capacity to do harm.” (“The New American Way of War,” NYRB 47:12, July 20, 2000)
^17	  “The nation-building enterprise pursued in all three [Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan] is imperial because its essential purpose is to create order in border zones essential to the security of great powers – and because armed force, an instrument only great powers can use with impunity, is critical to the task. It is imperial, finally, because while nominal power may return to the local capital – Kabul, Srajevo amd Priština – real power will continue to be exercised from London, Washington and Paris.” (Empire Lite 2003a, 109)
^18	  The discrepancy between means and ends was played out in the Kosovo war. “The precision technology could not stop ethnic cleansing on the ground, could not prevent the mass expulsion of the Kosovar people. We were faced in a curious way with having the omnipotent means that proved to be impotent in certain crucial respects.” Michael Ignatieff in an interview on PBS Television with Margaret Warner, May 30, 2000.
^19	  “We preach human rights ends, and then we practice such risk-averse means, that we can't actually accomplish those ends. That is to say, we did win, but 15,000 Kosovars were massacred and slaughtered. We couldn't stop that. Brave American pilots were upstairs at 15,000 feet watching people going from house to house with machine guns and knives and couldn't stop the ethnic cleansing. If you take these risk-averse means to accomplish human rights ends, you can't accomplish human rights ends. That's the problem.” Interview with Margaret Warner, PBS Television, March 30, 2000.
^20	  “[T]he moral empathy mediated by television has a history – the mergence of moral universalism in the Western conscience; this universalism has always been in conflict with the intuition that kith and kin have a moral priority over strangers; the twentieth-century inflection of moral universalism has taken the form of an anti-ideological and anti-political ethic of siding with the victim; the moral risk entailed by this ethic is misanthropy, a risk and a temptation heightened by television’s visual insistence on consequences rather than intentions.” (Warrior’s Honor 1997b, 25)
^21	  Ignatieff is far from isolated in his Hobbesian premises adapted to ethnic nationalism. “A pessimistic law of history was at work here. Many such communities coexisted for centuries, not just in the Caucasus but throughout Eurasia and North Africa. And yet they were, in reality, only held together by fear – the fear of what a brutal outside authority would do to them all if mutual tolerance broke down. When the external pressure was removed – whether it was the Caliphate, the Tsardom, the Otoman or British Empire, or Soviet power – then the current of fear which enforced that mutual tolerance was switched off. In the condition of ‘freedom,’ people began to look at one another in a new, warier way. In the condition of ‘democracy,’ people were invited to think about what divided them rather than what united them. And ethnicity – rather than wealth, class or social function – was the only dividing category which came to mind.” (Neil Ascherson, “In the Black Garden,” New York Review of Books, L:18, November 20, 2003, p. 37.) Ascherson was writing about the conflict over Nagorny Karabakh between the Armenians and the Azeris rather than about Iraq, but for writers like Ignatieff and Ascherson, the Hobbesian premises are fundamental and universal. Fear of the Leviathan and only fear of the Leviathan is the prerequisite to tolerance.
^22	  Cf. Michael Ignatieff’s essay, “Americans Abroad,” NYRB, 50:6, April 10, 2003 in which he discussed the effective global referendum on the use of American power in Iraq and the complementary aspect of the need to threaten force to make the credibility real if the Iraqis were to cooperate. As Ignatieff saw the dilemma, “The US threat to use force made inspections work in the first place, but now that inspections are finally yielding tangible results, most of the Security Council wants them to continue. Peaceful disarmament of the regime is only possible if a credible threat of force remains in place. But since the French, Russians, Germans, and Chinese are reluctant to authorize force, Saddam may believe that he can cheat even more intrusive inspections and get away with it. Unless, that is, he is certain the Americans and British would act unilaterally, without UN approval. So if they genuinely want disarmament and not regime change, there may be some logic in the American and British threat to use force unilaterally, since this is the threat that makes inspections work. But that logic has not won over the Council or the world. Nobody but the British and American governments think it is worth going to war over this issue, either now or in the future. The great coalition created by September 11 has collapsed.”
^23	  Such an account can be found in my forthcoming chapter, Howard Adelman (2004) “Recognition, restorative justice and retribution,” Siri Gloppen and Elin Skaar, eds. Roads to Reconciliation.
^24	  Ignatieff thought that, “Yugoslavia might be such a case. Fifty years was not enough time to forget.” (Blood and Belonging 1993a, 35) Is it likely that Iraq is any different?
^25	  Cf., Ronald Steel, “The Missionary,” a review essay on Wilsonianism. (The New York Review of Books, L:18, November 20, 2003, 26-35. Steel ends his essay with this sentence: “That is why Wilson is honored today not as a failed idealist but as an imperial figure for a nation in the flush of an imperial age.” (p. 35) As Steel summarizes American missionary intervention: “Liberals and conservatives may both be correct in considering themselves to be Wilsonians. In truth they are more alike than they admit in their ideological ambitions and their moral justifications…In practice, the difference between the interventionist liberals and the interventionist neoconservatives is more a matter of degree than of principle. It rests on how much exercise of military power the liberals will rationalize, and how much deference to liberal clichés the neoconservatives will tolerate.” (p. 26) For an excellent analysis of the Wilson doctrine on intervention, see the volume by the American foreign relations expert, Lloyd E. Ambrosius, who also tries to articulate a layered version of realism that is founded on the principle of the centrality of power and the need for a balance of power, but also takes into account the political economy, cultural pluralism and the use of a moral patina such as making the world safe for democracy in Wilson’s phrase (or, in Bush, making the world safe though spreading democracy) in his essays and in Wilsonianism: Woodrow Wilson and His Legacy in American Foreign Relations, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.
^26	  This is very different that Daniel Pipes’ critique. Pipes does not argue for clarity but makes the case that terrorism is a tactic and a strategy, not an enemy; the enemy is radical Islam.
^27	  Ignatieff is an unequivocal defender of intervention in Kosovo, but not of its strategy and tactics. “The central difficulty of the American way of war in Kosovo was that avoiding "collateral damage" to civilians and to nonmilitary targets and avoiding pilot loss were conflicting objectives. If pilots fly high, they can't identify targets accurately and the risks of horrifying accidents increase. Flying low improves accuracy but the risk to pilots is significantly increased. According to a careful study by William Arkin of Human Rights Watch, during the seventy-eight days of the Kosovo campaign, there was no loss of NATO lives, but the bombing claimed between 488 and 527 civilian lives. We can conclude from this that reducing risk to pilots ultimately mattered more than minimizing loss of civilian life.” (“The New American Way of War,” NYRB, 47:12, July 20, 2000) Further, this is not one of the places where he was worried that the United States would get out too fast. Quite the reverse! He wanted the West to face the inevitability of Kosovo independence. “The only outcome in Kosovo consistent with our principles is one that moves the province toward effective self-government by its own people and away from administration by the UN, NATO, and European Community personnel.” (Human Rights, 2001c, 47)
^28	  When Ignatieff uses the term virtual, as he first did in his analysis of the Kosovo conflict, he does not mean that the war was not real for those who were bombed or ethnically cleansed. Perhaps the clearest statement of his view was made in an interview with Margaret Warner on PBS television on May 30, 2000. (Tim Judah, who wrote on Kosovo as well, was also being interviewed.) As Ignatieff responded to Warner’s question about his use of the term ‘virtual’, he replied, “the war was real, as horribly real as war always is, to the people and citizens of Belgrade. To the Kosovo Albanians massacred by the paramilitaries, this is as real as it gets. It's death that makes war real. But to us, to the western alliance nations, to the spectators, people watching this program, it was a virtual spectacle; it existed only on television. One of the things about it as a war, which I think is historically unprecedented, is we transferred all of the mortal risk of death to the other side. It was a war fought under two basic rules: Zero casualties for our side, and as low a level of collateral damage as we could -- the first war that I can think of where we fought 78 days, 40,000 missions or something and not a single combat casualty.
^29	  “Desert Storm demonstrated the political necessity of coalition warfare. Coalition partners do not add much firepower, but they provide essential political legitimacy.” Michael Ignatieff, “The New American Way of War,” NYRB 47:12, July 20, 2000.
^30	  As Neil Ascherson has written adopting the same perspective: “In retrospect, the Nagorny-Karabakh war formed part of a specific episode in the history of nationalism. The collapse of the Soviet empire produced a ‘springtime of nations,’ not unlike those of 1848 or during the years between 1918 and 1920. Suppressed nationalities reclaimed independence and statehood, or asserted it for the first time. But at the same moment – and this often happened in those earlier upheavals – the removal of oppressive external authority transformed the nature of ethnic feelings in many old multicultural societies. Passive distaste for neighbors suddenly became dynamic and exclusive. Previously tolerant people discovered that ‘we’ cannot share our town or our land with ‘them’.” “In the Black Garden,” New York Review of Books, L:18, November 20, 2003, p. 39.
^31	  I am not sure whether Ignatieff forgot what Berlin wrote about romanticism “in ‘Sources of Romantic Thought’, the Mellon Lectures at the national gallery of Art in Washington in March and April 1965…he made the controversial claim that, until the Romantic era, the very idea that values might be in conflict had not arisen. Until the Romantics, serious philosophical opinion held that for any genuine question there must be one true answer; that these truths were accessible to all human beings; and that all the true answers to true questions must be compatible with each other.” (Berlin 1997a, 244-5) Ignatieff seemed more enamored by the tragic than the pluralist theme for “in the world revealed by the Romantics, tragedy was unavoidable; men were bound to disagree about the ultimate ends of life; those ends were themselves in conflict. Not all good things can be had at once. Conflict of values and tragic loss were unavoidable.” (1997a, 245)
^32	  This sense of love arising out of shared experiences in the passages of life that result in mutual loyalties  was clearly recognized by Michael. In an essay entitled, “Lodged in the Heart and Memory,” Times Literary Supplement, Ignatieff said, “As time begins to elapse, one begins to love the other because they have shared the same experience, the same moments of duration. Selves may not intertwine but lives do, and shared memory becomes as much of a bond as the bond of the flesh. One might say shared memory is not love itself but a consequence of being in love; but in what people commonly say about long-lasting love, it is the attitudes toward time implied in such words such as constancy and fidelity that recur.”
^33	  When Ignatieff asks one of the Tatars why they have survived, the answer given is: “we do not marry outside the Tatars. Big peoples can afford intermarriage. We have to have strict rules. And so we have strong families, and respect for our elders is the way we maintain strength and continuity in our traditions.” Ignatieff comment on this reply is that, “ it is obvious from the faces that they have been intermarrying with Russians and Ukrainians for centuries.” (Blood and Belonging 1993a, 136) He interpreted as statement of racism, blood and belonging rather than a statement of tradition and belonging, a common confusion of cosmopolitans who cannot distinguish these very different types of nationalism or their confused responses to the different types. For Tatars do not allow intermarriage in the sense of marriage between an insider and an outsider who chooses to remain an outsider, but if a member of another people chooses to adopt their traditions and culture, they are welcomed into the fold.
^34	  The nationalism of land and graves is characteristic of many groups all over the world. “This border region between Turkey and Iraq is where I finally learn the human difference between a people who have their own place and a people who do not. On one side, hearts and minds are open. On the other, hearts pound with fear. [The Kurds in Kurdish Iraq vs the Kurds in Turkey] …Statelessness is a state of mind, and it is akin to homelessness. This is what a nationalist [what I call a nationalist of land, tradition and graves] understands: a people can become completely human, completely themselves, only when they have a place of their own.” (Blood and Belonging 1993a, 212) The point of having a land of one’s own is to avoid struggles against another people so each nation can live side by side the other in not only mutual respect, but with respect towards any minority in their midst. “Nationalism by its very nature defines struggles between peoples as struggles for their honor, identity and soul.” (Blood and Belonging 1993a, 217) If that dignity and respect are granted, then the struggle does not deteriorate into violence but evolves into cooperation and respect for differences.
^35	  In his essay, “Whispers from the Abyss,” (New York Review of Books, 43:13, October 3, 1996) reviewing three then recent books on the Soviet gulag, Michael made the wry comment that, unlike fallible human memory, the administrative memory of a totalitarian state and God’s memory, commemorated in the Russian Orthodox service for the dead singing the "Viechnaya Pamyat, "Eternal Memory," are alike in that both never forget anything. However, they differ in one major respect: in the nationalism of land and tradition and graves, the effort is to preserve memory as a constant; in a totalitarian state, though everything is preserved in archives, what is made public is constantly being rewritten and reconstructed to suit the engineering of human souls as seen to be required at that moment.
^36	  Ignatieff will again and again depict the nationalist struggles as a war between bothers along the model of Cain and Abel. “Ethnic war remains a family quarrel, a duel to the death between brothers that can only be resolved within the family, and only when fear no longer rules.” (Warrior’s Honor 1997b, 7) In a very different section dealing with the philosophical presumptions, I will challenge his understanding of the Cain-Abel story and his generalizations based on his Hobbesian interpretation, a sense Ignatieff himself hints at but overlooks when he observed: “The root of intolerance lies in our tendency to overvalue our own identities; by overvalue, I mean we insist that we have nothing in common, nothing to share. At the heart of this insistence lurks the fantasy of purity, of boundaries that can never be crossed.” (Warrior’s Honor 1997b, 62) This doctrine of a search for identity and a reverence for purity has nothing to do with insecurity and fear of the other and a retreat to ones own ethnic group for security. Ignatieff’s doctrine of the narcissism of minor differences has more to do with this than his Hobbesian premises. When Ignatieff describes nationalism as a kind of narcissism of minor difference resulting in a systematic overvaluation of self and devaluation of the other, so that it depends on and exacerbates intolerance, he comes closer to understanding it. “The particular property of the narcissist gaze is that it glances up at the Other only to confirm its difference,” (Warrior’s Honor 1997b, 52) and not out of fear. “Violence must be done to the self before it can be done to others.” (1997, p. 54) In another chapter, I will comment on Igantieff’s inverse relationship of the less the difference, the more the aggression. “It is precisely because the differences between groups are minor that they must be expressed aggressively. The less substantial the differences between two groups, the more they both struggle to portray those differences as absolute.” (1997, p. 51) But for now, if readers wish to get a sense of the difference between Ignatieff’s Hobbesian interpretation and my own, I refer readers to the following: Howard Adelman (1997) "Of Human Bondage: Labour, Bondage and Freedom in the Phenomenology," in Essays on Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, ed. Jon Stewart, SUNY Press, pp. 155-171, and Howard Adelman (1996) "Of Human Bondage: Labour and Freedom in the Phenomenology," in John O'Neill, ed., Hegel's Dialectic of Desire and Recognition: Texts and Commentary, Albany: SUNY Press, 171-186.
^37	  Cf. Tara Bahrampour’s essay on the Iranian diaspora in Los Angeles entitled, “Persia on the Pacific,” The New Yorker, November 10, 2003, p. 32 where she describes a teenager, Jonathan (Parshaw) Dooriz, born in the US who awakened to the powerful draw of Iranian nationalism at the age of 12 after the Iranian soccer team beat the US team 2-1. As Jonathan was recorded: “it was the first time I’d seen Iranians all rooting for the same thing instead of arguing about ‘the Shah did this,’ ‘the mullahs did that.’ I saw a sense of unity, and I felt it was something important.”
^38	  [331e] lege dê, eipon egô, su ho tou logou klêronomos, ti phêis ton Simônidên legonta orthôs legein peri dikaiosunês hoti, ê d' hos, to ta opheilomena hekastôi apodidonai dikaion esti.
^39	  In Ignatieff’s words, “Croations claimed [my italics] the right of national self-determination, and they so had influential backing from the newly reunited Germany.” (Blood and Belonging 1993a, 27) Nowhere that I could find does Michael indicate that constitutionally, each republic had the right to secede.
^40	  “There is little doubt that the gut appeal of Quebec nationalism lies for most Quebecers in the vision of being a majority in their own society rather than a permanent, if powerful, minority within a federal Canada. But most Quebecers insist that theirs is not an ethnic but a liberal nationalism, based on equal citizenship.” (Blood and Belonging 1993a, 169)
^41	  In this propensity to radical and oppositional dichotomies that squash other distinctions, he follows in the footsteps of his mentor, Isaiah Berlin. “Key elements of his creed were already in place: the inaugural lecture [as Chichele Professor at Oxford] offered him the chance to bring them together into a single coherent statement. He recast the earlier contrast between ‘liberal’ and ‘romantic’ conceptions of freedom into a sharper distinction between negative and socialist and communist cousins. As he put it with blunt succinctness, liberals ‘want to curb authority as such’, while the rest ‘want it placed in their own hands’. Negative liberty was the core of a properly liberal political creed: leaving individuals alone to do what they want, provided that their /actions did not interfere with the liberty of others. Positive liberty was at the core of all emancipatory theories of politics, from socialist to communist: for all such doctrines wish to use political power to free human beings to realise some hidden, blocked or repressed potential. The European Enlightenment, he argued, was divided by a central contradiction: between maintaining that men should be free to choose and insisting that they should choose what it would be rational to desire.” (Berlin 1997a, 226) Berlin’s radical distinction between negative liberty of civic nationalism and positive liberty of ethno-nationalism in Ignatieff’s terms ignores the fact that ethno-nationalism as a politics of resentment and murder while using the language of emancipation is only negative, not in the passive version of civic nationalism, but in its murderous and destructive program, whereas the nationalism of tradition and land as well as the romantic nationalism of ideas and language are positive in a very different sense. 
